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Foreword 
By emphasizing the symmetry of certain set theoretic conditions, shown to be associ- 
ated with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, a characterization of "kinds of axioms" is ob- 
tained. More precisely, if the defining properties of a model satisfies these conditions, 
then the model must have a conclusion much like that of Arrow's theorem. Because the 
conditions are described in set theoretic terms, the applicability of these results extends 
beyond the usual setting of complete, binary, transitive rankings to space of utility func- 
tions, probability distributions, etc. In this manner, not only can new extensions of 
Arrow's theorem be obtained, but it is shown how the same "kinds of axioms" applies to, 
say, problems about the aggregate excess demand function, the Hurwicz-Schmeidler dicta- 
torial result about Pareto optimal, Nash equilibria, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
about manipulability, etc. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program 
Stirmlated by A r r o w ' s  seminal work [I] ,  socia l  choice has become an ac t ive  
research area. There are lists of axioms forcing impossibility statements, 
conditions admitting poss ib i l i ty  assert ions,  and the Gibbard [3] - Satterthwaite 
[ 191 theorem a b u t  rranipulation. (An excellent  survey is Sen [20]. ) What is 
missing from the l i t e r a t u r e  is a simple, unifying mthematical explanation - one 
t h a t  with a single argument can sukume several seemingly d i f ferent  conclusions, 
one t h a t  eas i ly  permits extensions of classical theorems and the derivation of new 
resu l t s ,  and one t h a t  captures the elusive f r o n t i e r  between poss ib i l i ty  and 
impossibility statements. A s t e p  toward such a description is given here. The 
idea is to s h i f t  emphasis from wh3t pwticijlar set of axions yield poss ib i l i ty  o r  
i m s s i b i l i t y  conclusions, to w1~t kin& of axiom cause these resul ts .  This 
approach is i l l u s t r a t d  by showing how A r r o w ' s  T b r e m ,  several other soc ia l  choice 
resu l t s ,  a s t a t i s t i c a l  paradox a b u t  contingency tables ,  the Hurwicz-Schidler 
study of o p t i m l  Nash equi l ibr ia ,  ce r t a in  questions a b u t  economic al location 
procedures, and conclusions from several other discipl ines are a l l  closely related.  
This assert ion may be surprising if only because the examples come from dif ferent  
discipl ines where the sets of underlying assumptions or axioms m y  have l i t t le  to 
do with each other. What unif ies these mdels is t h a t  w h i l e  the assumptions and 
axioms d i f f e r ,  they are a l l  of the s m  mmbinatoric End; consequently, these 
rrndels have related properties. For instance, by characterizing what kinds of 
axiom- give rise to an Arrowtype theorem, as I do here, r e su l t s  from d i f fe ren t  
l i t e ra tu res  can be unified and extended i n  several  direct ions.  
My presentation has a geometric f lavor where the goal is to create  an 
e a s i l y  used, versa t i le  technique. The idea is this. Often, aggregation mde ls  
from socia l  choice, economics, probability, and other areas are described i n  terms 
of the requirements we want the system to sa t i s fy ;  e. g. , the  independence 
conditions from socia l  choice. But, are these conditions self-contradictorfl To 
invest igate this issue we might examine a l l  logical ,  combinatoric p s i b i l i t i e s .  
I t  turns out t h a t ,  f o r  several  mde l s ,  the  combinatoric analysis of the  axiom 
involve related argum?nts. This suggests characterizing "MI& of axiom-" i n  terms 
of the associated combinatoric analysis.  This program is started here; I 
characterize the  kind of axioms t h a t  a m  related to Arrow's theorem. To do so, I 
introduce a geometric representation t h a t  I call the bhwy  owxlap principle. I t  
is based the geometry of ce r t a in  sets - the "level sets" of the imposed conditions. 
We now k n o w  why s o c i a l  aggregation procedures have d i f f i c u l t i e s .  An 
aggregation process mps a d m i n  onto a rmch smaller range, so the problems and 
paradoxes are created by the "squashed overflow". In an earlier paper [ 161 (also 
see [15]), I demnstrated t ha t  this explains the paradoxes f o r  several classes of 
socia l  choice, voting, and probability mdels. To prove rw assert ion,  I embedded 
"discrete d e l s "  i n b  classes of s m t h  mppings. Then, the existence and the 
creation of new paradoxes are obtained with calculus techniques. But certain 
discrete problem, such as A r r o w ' s  t b r e m ,  cannot be handled i n  this m r .  So, 
tk resul ts  given here can be viewed as extending tk discussion of [16]. Indeed, 
one can show tha t  the overlap principle corresponds b the rank conditions of [16]. 
A secondary t k m e  fo r  this paper corn  from economics. Sen [20,p.1074] 
points out tha t  "Economists did not . . take nuch notice of  this [social c h i ce ]  
l i teratum, or of t h  pmblem studied i n  them, until the "infomtional  crisis" 
sent them s m h i n g  for other m t h d s .  " One way tD study infonmtion is with the 
mchanism introduced by L. Hurwicz [6]; an approach tha t  has proved b be a 
convenient f o m l a t i o n  tD analyze incentive problem and organizational design. A 
central  issue is b understand the relationship between an allocation process and 
the associated mchanism. For s m t h  mchanism, we have answers; i n  [9,17,18] 
geomtr ic  tools are created tha t  characterize a l l  possible "message mchanism" 
associated with a given " s m t h  allocation procedures". But, because this 
characterization is based on the level sets of cer ta in  s m t h  functions, the 
techniques do not extend tD discrete allocation processes - indeed, the discrete 
problem remins open. (Some par t ia l  results  are i n  [81. ) However, as S. Reiter 
[ 13 ] recognized, social  choice d e l s  are discrete examples of Hurwicz 's "one 
shot" mechanism. So, i n  this s p i r i t ,  a secondary objective of this paper is tD 
use the analysis of social  choice mxlels tD understand w h t  kind of mathematics is 
needed fo r  the mchanism design of discrete system. I t  turns out t ha t  the "level 
set" approach still applies where the dif ferent ia l  geomtric techniques developed 
to analyze the level sets f o r  s m t h  allocation procedures are replaced with an 
algebraic group theoretic analysis. 
The emergence of these algebraic structures reinforces rw belief [I51 tha t  
t h y  explain the d i f f icu l t i es  c o m n  tD social  choice and other discrete decision 
and allocation problem. (This runs against Sen 's c o m n t  [20, p. 10781 , " . . h~t;  - 
Lww;ile - IJO 'gtni~p tJmry ' is i ~ ~ w ~ l  VW:~!" ) These algebraic synmetries - the wreath 
p d u c t  of certain permtation groups - play a c r i t i c a l  role  i n  the development of 
the overlap principle; indeed, a complete characterization of other classes of 
"kinds of axioms" re l ies  on these st.ructures. However, I decided tD suppress these 
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complicated, algebraic s y m ~ t r y  structures i n  order to focus a t tent ion  on the  
overlap principle and to rmke the  paper easier to read. (A brief introduction to 
the  wreath product is i n  [ 151. ) 
In Section 2,  the  basic concepts used i n  this paper are introduced with a 
two voter ,  three candidate formulation of A r r o w ' s  theorem. In Section 3 ,  the ideas 
are akstracted in to  the  overlap principle. The f l e x i b i l i t y  of the overlap 
principle is i l l u s t r a t e d  by obtaining simple proofs of several  known soc ia l  choice 
r e s u l t s  as w e l l  as to derive some new, and s o m  whirmica1 ones. In this m e r ,  
the  connection m n g  several w e l l  known socia l  choice r e su l t s  along with problems 
from statistics, economics, and game theory becomes imnediate. Because the  
emphasis of the  overlap principle is on h o w  the i m ~ 4 4  p ~ t p s r t i e s  o r  ax iom divide 
in fo rmt ion  i n t o  equivalence c lasses ,  ra ther  than on what par t icular  informt ion 
used (e. g. , complete, binary, t r ans i t ive  rankings) , extensions are inmdia te .  To 
i l l u s t r a t e  how impl ic i t ly  defined overlap conditions arise, a new proof of the  
Gibbard - Sattert,hwaite Theorem as well as the  Hirwicz-Schidler  theorem [ lo]  a b u t  
Pareto o p t i m l  Nash equi l ibr ia  are given. Some extensions of the  overlap principle 
as w e l l  as a descript ion of the  f r o n t i e r  between poss ib i l i ty  and impossibility 
conclusions are given in  Section 4. Section 5 contains the  proofs of the m j o r  
theorems. 
The ideas of this paper can be demnstrated with a geomtr i c  proof of 
A r r o w ' s  theorem f o r  a two voter ,  three candidate process. To do this, we need a 
geometric representation f o r  the  complete, binary, t r ans i t ive  rankings of the  
candidates {cl , Q , ~3 ). Sta r t ing  with an equi la tera l  t r iangle ,  ident i fy  each 
vertex with a candidate. (See Figure 1. ) In this t r i ang le ,  define a binary 
re la t ionship  i n  terms of the  proximity of a pojnt to a vertex. Thus, a point p 
corresponds to the  ranking cl >Q i f  and only i f  p is closer  to vertex cl than to 
vertex Q .  Tllis relat ionship divides the  equi la tera l  triangle i n to  the  regions 
displayed i n  Figure 1. The open regions - the smllest t r iangles  - correspond to 
strict rankings without " indifference" m n g  the  candidates , while the  l i n e  
segmnts  and the  baricentr ic  point. correspond to rankings with indifference. For 
instance, region A corresponds to the  ranking cl >c2 >% , while the  l i n e  s e m n t  
between regions C and D represents c3 >cl=c2. Let P(1,2,3)  denote the  3 ! o R n  

regions where the  rankings do not admit indifference. Let P ( i  , j ) denote the two 
equivalence classes of rankings i n  P(1,2,3)  where ci>cj  and where cj>ci.  
Consequently, P(1,2) = { {A ,  B,C) , {DIE, F)) . Geomtrical ly,  t h e  t w o  equivalence 
classes are the  two  r ight  t r iangles i n  Figure 1 separated by the l ine  cl=cz.  In 
general, the t w o  sets i n  P ( i , j )  are represented by the  t w o  r ight  t r iangles  
separated by the  indifference l ine  ci=cj. I ' l l  show how Arrow's theorem is a 
consequence of the  geomtr ic  positioning of these sets of r ight  t r iangles.  
In a t w o  voter, three candidate context without indifference, a socia l  
welfare function is a mapping 
2 . 1  F: P(1,2 ,3)  x P(1,2,3) -----> P(1,2 ,3) .  
The cartesian product represents the  two  voters'  possible rankings. The standard 
Armwian conditions are replaced with the following requiremnts. 
1. The usual Pareto condition forces a l l  o u t c o m  to be admitted. I 
require only t h a t  F is onto. 
2. The IIA condition states t h a t  f o r  each i and j ,  the  re la t ive  ranking of 
ci and cj  depends only on the voters ' re la t ive  rankings of these candidates. This 
is equivalent to requiring for each choice of i, j ,  that 
2.2 F: P ( i ,  j )  x P ( i ,  j )  ----> P ( i ,  j). 
3. If the f i r s t  voter is a d ic ta to r  f o r  F, then F can be represented by a 
mapping depending only on the f i r s t  variable. Replace the  "no dictator" axiom with 
the condition t h a t  F cannot be represented by a function of a single variable. 
Theom 1. T k m  does not  exist a napping of the form given by h u a t i o n  2 .1  that 
s a t i s f i e s  conditions 1, 2, and 3. If a napping given by h. 2.1 satisfies 1 and 2,  
then it can be remerited by a function of a single variable t h a t  is generated 
either by mapping each relat ionship ci >cj to itself (a d ic ta to r ) ,  o r  by mapping 
each xelationship ci >cj to c >ci (an anti-dictator) . 
Arrow's theorem is an i d i a t e  consequence. An e a l i e r  version of t h i s  
r e s u l t  is i n  Saar i  [14], and a portion of it w a s  restated i n  a ax iomt ic  form i n  
K i m  and Rouch [12]. See Sen [20] f o r  added discussion and references. 
Outline of the pmof. Assume t h a t  the  theorem is f a l s e  because. such an F 
exis ts .  By (3) , there are si tuat ions where each voter,  by changing rankings, can 
a l t e r  thw outcome. According to (2) , i f  thz new ranking i n t e r c l s ~ x e s  the re la t ive  
ranking of ci and c j ,  then it is because t he  voter  changed her r e l a t i v e  ranking of 
these two a l t e rna t ives .  In f a c t ,  from (2 ) ,  this same P ( i ,  j) change i n  F occurs 
whenever 1) she rmkes this change i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  rankings and 2)  the o the r  voter  
keeps his sam ranking of this pai r .  
This argument reduces the  ana lys is  to how F changes the  r e l a t i v e  rankings 
of pairs of candidates.  (Thus, t he  rest of t he  proof relies on the  pos i t ion ing  of 
t he  r i g h t  t r i ang le s  in Figure 1. ) Because of (3) and symnetry, assume without l o s s  
of genera l i ty  t h a t  t he re  are s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  voter  1 can alter t he  r e l a t i v e  
ranking of cl and q and there are s i t u a t i o n s  where voter  2 can a l t e r  the r e l a t i v e  
ranking of c2 and c3. Namly, if voter  2 has a spec i f ied  ranking of cl and c 2 ,  
then as voter  1 va r i e s  her rankings between t he  r i g h t  t r i ang le s  represent ing cl>c2 
and c 2 > c l ,  s o  does the  imge of F (but  no t  necessar i ly  i n  t he  same d i r e c t i o n . )  I f  
t he  specif ied ranking f o r  voter  2 is c l > c z ,  then let him vary between regions A and 
B; otherwise, le t  him vary between D and E. In either s i t ua t ion ,  vo ter  2 has f ixed  
P(1,2)  and f ixed P(1 ,3)  rankings while re ta in ing  the  freedom to change his P(2 ,3 )  
ranking. A s imi l a r  ana lys is  holds f o r  voter  1. In order  f o r  voter  2 to change t h e  
P(2,3)  outcome, voter  1 may need to have a s p e c i f i c  ranking of this pai r .  I f  it is 
t h e  r i g h t  t r i a n g l e  c2 > 5 ,  l e t  her vary between A and F; i f  it is c3 >c2 ,  then 
pastrict her to C and D. Again, voter  1 can chmge her P(  1 ,2)  ranking while 
keeping her P(2,3)  and P(1 ,3)  rankings f ixed.  
As t h e  voters  vary i n  t h e i r  assigned regions,  tk P(1,2)  and P(2,3)  
imges of F ( the  group o u b o m )  change independent of each other.  Thus, t he re  are 
s i t ua t ions  w h e r e  t h e  P(1 ,2)  ouborne is t h e  r i g h t  t r i a n g l e  corresponding to c l > c 2 ,  
while the  P(2,3)  ouborne is t he  r i g h t  t r i a n g l e  corresponding to c2 >c3. These two 
t r i ang le s  i n t e r s e c t  i n  region A - c l > c 2 > 5  - which forces  t he  binary ranking of 
cl >c3. On the  o ther  hand, there are s i t ua t ions  w h e r e  the  two " t r iangle"  outcomes 
are +, >cl and c3 >+,. The in te rsec t ion  of these t r i ang le s  is region D, which 
requires  c3 >cl. Consequently, even tIkx.gl, b t h  voters have fix& P (1,3 rakirgs, 
t l ~  gzvc~p ralliirg of t k s e  tm alterxatives, giver] by the i m w  of F, clxinges. This 
cont rad ic t s  (2) , and the  f i r s t  part of the  theorem is proved. 
The second part of t he  theorem a l s o  follows from the geometric posi t ioning 
of t he  r i g h t  t r i ang le s .  Obviously, a d i c t a t o r  o r  an an t i -d i c t a to r  can be defined,  
s o  w e  only need to show that no other  rapping exists. Without loss  of gene ra l i t y ,  
assure there is a rapping g:P(1,2,3)  --> P(1 ,2 ,3)  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  (1) and (21, t h a t  
preserves the P(1,2)  rmlki ly,  h ~ t  reverses  t . 1 ~  P (2 ,3)  ralddng. This f o r c m  t h e  
imges of c, >c2 and of c3 >c2 to be the two r igh t  t r i ang les  containing A. Indeed, 
the intersect ion of these two tr iangles is precisely A - cl>c2 >c3. Because this 
intersect ion def i= the  re la t ive  ranking c, >c3 , the  def in i t ion  of ,g over P ( 1,2 ) 
and P(2,3)  uniquely determines g:P(1,3) - ->  P(1,3).  More precisely, the g preirrage 
of cl >c3 is aw P(1,3) ranking met ing the intersect ion of the  tr iangles f o r  c, >c2 
and c3 >c2.  In Figure 1, this intersection is {B, C} . k t ,  B and C are  in  
d i f ferent  P ( l ,  3 )  classes.  According to (2) , this forces g to be the const;u,t 
mppixg over P(1,3) t h a t  maps both c1 >5 and 5 >cl to cl >c3. This contradicts (1) 
and proves the  second part of the theorem. 
The proofs of both parts of the theorem depend upon the  symnetry properties 
of the  simplex as  captured by positioning of the  r i g h t  triangles i n  the three 
equivalence classes P ( i ,  j). Cri t i ca l  to this analysis is t h a t  the geomtry of the  
imge S ~ C E !  is restrictive; e .  g. , f o r  each t r iangle  from P(1,2)  there is one from 
P(2,3)  where t h e i r  intersect ion is i n  only one t r i ang le  from P(1,3) .  Moreover, 
t h i s  holds f o r  each triangle i n  P(1,3) .  This r e s t r i c t i v e  e f f e c t  on the inrage fixed 
the  imges of F to obtain the  contradiction. Similarly,  i n  the  second part of the  
theorem, these imge res t r i c t ions  limited the options f o r  g. The second critic21 
element is t h a t  t h e  geomtry admits flexibility of m v e m n t  in the domain. For 
each t r iangle  from P( 1 ,2 )  there is one from P(2,3)  where tkir intersection 
both t r iangles  from P ( l ,  3 ) .  This w a s  used i n  both parts of thr, t h r e m  to allow a 
voter to a l t e r  his rankings of one pai r  while retaining f ixed rankings f o r  the 
o ther  two. Added f l e x i b i l i t y  occurs i f  a t  least two voters a f f e c t  tk outcorrp,. 
The proof of the  thorem exploits  this contradictory interplay between r e s t r i c t i o m  
( i n  the  range) and the  f l e x i b i l i t y  (in the  donnin) admitted by the  overlapping 
geometry. The f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  geomtry w a s  derived from binary, t r ans i t ive ,  ordinal  
rankings is incidental.  Consequently, the  essence of A r r o w ' s  theorem extends to a 
surprisingly wide realm of s i tua t ions .  Indeed, whenever a set of axiom; can be 
described with a similar geomtr ic  representation, the  sm conclusions resul t .  In 
o ther  words, the  kinds of axiom t h a t  lead to an Arrow-like theorem can be 
characterized by emphasizing the  appropriate geometric - set t h o r e t i c  conditions 
of overlapping regions. 
3. THE OVEEUA' PRINCIPLE 
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In this s e c t i o n ,  an overlap pr inc ip le  is introduced and i l l u s t r a t e d  with 
severa l  examples. The examples are se lec ted  to s b w  why the s m  basic  argument 
proves and extends seve ra l  classical theorem and to suggest o the r  uses of t h e  main 
t h r e m .  
Notation: kt I A I  dexmte t h  cardinality of set A. If A = {AI,. . ,&I ard B = 
&, . . ,]Eb) a m  oollection of sets, let NU3 = {Aj% : 1LjCr1, & h n } .  
Let D = D1x. a be the ca r t e s i an  product of t h e  N12 s e t s  I&, le t  R be a 
given s e t ,  and let  
3 . 1  F:D ---> R 
be given. The s e t s  Dj replace the  domin  s e t s  P (1 ,2 ,3 )  from Section 2. There is 
no r e s t r i c t i o n  on t h e  choice of Dj -- it could be a s e t  of binary,  t r a n s i t i v e  
rankings, p robabi l i ty  measures, spaces of admissible s t r a t e g i e s ,  funct ion spaces of 
u t i l i t y  funct ions,  o r  any-thing e l se .  Indeed, t he  choice of Dj could even d i f f e r  
from agent to agent where, s ay ,  Dl is a s e t  of t r a n s i t i v e  rankings, Q is a s e t  of 
probabi l i ty  measures, e t c .  The critical aspect is not  what i n f o m t i o n  is 
represented by Dj, but, how the  i l l formt ion  is divided i n t o  equivalence s e t s .  
Replacing the  d iv is ion  of P (1 ,2 ,3 )  i n t o  the  subsets P ( i  , j) is t h e  d iv i s ion  of each 
set I& into the  i~ fo~m?t io~~a l  w ~ i ~ l e ~ ~ i ~  c?l,wses I j  (k) {IJ ( k , l )  , I j  (k ,2)} ,  
j=1 ,2 ,3 .  The superscr ip t  j indices  t he  three "independence conditions" while k 
i d e n t i f i e s  the voter  o r  agent. The cartesian prodi~ct. Ij = X, I j  (k) replaces 
(P ( i  ,s)}N i n  the  independence condition Eq. 2.2. 
Although Ij replaces t h e  "indepndence" o r  IIA conditions of A r r o w ' s  
theorem, these sets can be d i f i e d  to include d e l s  with interdependency amng 
voters '  rankings o r  agents ' act ions.  Such interdependency can be viewed as 
def in ing  E, a proper s u b e t  of D. I f  E is given, then the  sets Ij are restricted 
t~ E. More prec ise ly ,  I j ( k ) ,  k l , . . ,  N ,  is defined by 1JN.T. For instance,  
E=((cl>c2 )N, ( ~ 2  > c l ) N )  requires  a11 voters  to have the  sam r e l a t i v e  ranking of t he  
candidates cl and c 2 .  With such an E, I1 = P(1,2)NT'IE E while I2 = P(2,3N)N.T 
P(2,3)N. This E d e l s  t h e  Pareto condition i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Corollary 2.6. 
The range, R, can be any set where the  c r i t i c a l  aspect  is its subdivision 
i n t o  o ther  equivalence s e t s .  Let this subdivision be given by R j  = 
{Rjl ,Rj2, .  . ,Rjk}, W ,  j=1,2,3.  The s e t s ,  Rj, replace t h e  earlier suMiv i s ion  of 
t h e  range P(1,2,3)  into t h e  th ree  classes of two s e t s ,  P ( i ,  j ) .  
Overlap theorrem - k i n  m u l t s  Rge 8 
The g e o ~ t r i c  onditions t h a t  provide the  interplay between the  f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  the  domin with r ig id i ty  i n  the  range are captured by the following defini t ion.  
kf inition. The triple €F, CIJ I ,  CRJ I} ,  j= 1,2,3, s a t i s f i e s  the himry ouerlap 
principle if the following four oonditiors hold. 
1. For each j a d  each k I,.. ,N ,  lh two suhsets {IJ(k , l ) ,  IJ(k,2)} are 
eitkr dis jo in t  o r  equal. For each j, t b m  is a t  least one c h i o e  of k tb 
sets am disjoint .  
2. (Dnmai_ll o m l a p )  For each choice of k a d  f o r  each permrtation (a,b,c) 
of (1,2,3), them is a pezmrtation (u,v) of (1,2) s o  tbt each of I n ( k , l ) f P  (k,u) 
a d  1s (k ,2 ) fP  (k,v) met both IC (k, 1) and IC (k,2). The restricted damin d t i m  
is whem, f o r  each pennrtation (a, b, c) , the doimin wrdi t ion  .is sa t i s f i ed  f o r  a 
unique pernutation (u, v) . (Thrs , Ia (k, 1) n P  (k, u) does not met both I C  classes f o r  
both chi- of u. ) For at  l e a s t  one k, the mst r i c t ed  ckmdn  overlap wrd i t ions  
am sat isf ied.  
3. (Range o m l a p )  kt R j  ' denote some pair of sutsets of R j  . For each 
permrtation (a,b,c) of (1,2,3) and fo r  each pair of suhiets, t h ~  a m  two s u k e t s  
i n  R a ' W '  t ha t  do not m e t  the saxre subset of Rc. 
4. (Invarianoe) a )  For j = 1,2,3, F : I J  -> R j .  
b) For a t  l eas t  two choices of j, tk hmge of F meets at least t m  of the 
RJ sets. 
5. If tbe domin indep=mkme wnditiolls an? detc 3 bu an 
intmdepsdemy wrdi t ion  E, then for a t  least two choioes of j whem the limage of 
F is nomnstan t ,  IJ (Yi = Ij . 
As in Section 2 ,  the "dictator" is replaced with tk mre general concept 
of a function of a s ingle variable. 
M i n i t i o n .  kt % : D - > 4, be the ~ t u r a l  pm jection mpping. The mpping 
F: D -> R can be ~pmsenhd ly a function af a sirgle variahle if  the^ exists a 
choice of k a d  a &:4, --> R s o  tbt I? = gk(%). 
This def in i t ion  does not  require F to be a function of a s ing le  variable. 
For instance, suppose three voters rank the three candidates c j ,  j=1,2 ,3 ,  with the  
following Mdif ica t ion of the  Borda Count. The i t h  ranked al ternat ive  f o r  the jth 
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voter is assigned (3-i) 10j p i n t s .  The t a l l y  f o r  each candidate determines the  
ordinal  ranking of the al ternatives and defines the mpping 
F: {P(1,2,3)}3 ----> P(1,2,3) .  Although F is a function of a l l  three variables,  it 
can te identif ied with the identi ty mpping (d ic ta tor)  g,:P(1,2,3) - ->  P(1 ,2 ,3 ) .  
If F ( 1,2,3 ) denotes a l l  13 rankings depicted i n  F i g u r e  1, then F can be extended 
-to a napping F: ( F ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) ) 3  ---> F ( 1 , 2 , 3 )  by assuming t h a t  when the  i t h  voter is 
indi f ferent  between two candidates, each of these two candidates receives the 
obvious average of the assigned p i n t s .  This choice of F creates sequential 
dictators; if the th i rd  voter is indifferent  between two candidates, then the 
second voter decides tk group ranking between them. If both the second and t h i r d  
voters are indifferent  between the sm two candidates, then the f i r s t  voter 
decides. (This is generalized i n  Theorem 3 ,  Section 4 .  ) 
The overlap conditions capture the essence of the  geometric proof of our 
version of Arrow's theorem. Thus, i n  l i g h t  of the proof of Theorem 1, T h r e m  2 
should be expected. T k  f o m l  proof i n  Section 5 is jus t  an a t s t r a c t  version of 
t h e  proof i n  Section 2. 
Theom 2. Assum that F: D -> R satisfies t k  binary overlap principle w i t h  
the sets {IJ) and mi). When F is v i e d  as a napping 
3.2 F: 11nm-m -> R ~ w ~ ,  
t h m  is an index k so that F can be repxsented by a function of a single 
variable, gk. 
Suppose the image of F meets the pairs {Rj l  ,Rj2), j=1,2,3.. Tkm a~ 
pmcisely an> ways to &fine gk , and each is uniqwly determined by w k t h r  Ij (k, 1) 
or U(k,2) is mapped to R j l .  Tk index k satisfies the mstricted domain condition 
and all three Ij (k) classes have two disjoint elemmts. If m such index exists, 
then F doesn't exist. 
Theorem 2 asserts  t h a t  the  tensions between the  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  the domin 
and r i g i d i t y  i n  the  range extend Arrow's theorem. Moreover, a new feature  emrges. 
If the  domin of each voter admits e i the r  too much f l e x i b i l i t y  o r  too m c h  
r i g i d i t y ,  as captured by the last sentence, then such an F doesn't e x i s t  even with 
only one voter. For F to e x i s t ,  even as a dictatorship,  res t r ic t ions  on t he  dormin 
are required. For mt sozial  choice examples, the res t r ic ted  domin conditions 
are sat.isf ied, but th i s  need not be s o  f o r  examples from probability and economics. 
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Applications of lhmm 2 
Start ing with A r r o w ' s  theorem, I ' l l  i l l u s t r a t e  the considerable f l e x i b i l i t y  
offered by Theorem 2. To underscore which overlap fea tu re  is being discussed - the 
nature of F, the possible defini t ions fo r  the domin,  o r  the choice of the range - 
examples a re  selected to emphasize only t h a t  feature.  To s t a r t ,  we extend the 
notation i n  Section 2. For the n candidates, {cl , . . ,c,}, let P(1, .  . ,n)  denote the  
s e t  of a l l  n! corqplete, binary t rans i t ive  rankiw5 w i t b u t  ties of t h e  
candidates. If A is a subset of t h e  indices, then an e l e m n t  of P (A) cons is ts of 
the n! / ( A  1 ! rankings of P( 1 , .  . , n) tht preserves the  re la t ive  ranking of t k ~  
candidates i n  A. P(A) is the obvious extension of P ( i ,  j) where its e lemnts  a re  
the I A 1 ! dis jo in t  subsets of P(1 , .  . ,n) . The f i r s t  corollary extends Theorem 1 to 
any ( f i n i t e )  number of candidates and voters. 
Comllary 2.1.  kt 1123, N 2 ,  and F : ( P ( l , . . ,  n))N ---> P ( l , . . ,  n) be given. Suppcse 
F is onto ard tbat for each piir ( i ,  j ) ,  F satisfies the indepedeme cordition 
F: ( P ( i , j ) )  - -  P i )  F can be ~p.msentsd ty a f d o n  of a single variable 
that c o m p o r d s  to e i k  a dictator or to an anti-dictator. 
Fkuof. S b r t  with 11 (k) = R1 = P(1,2),  I 2  (k) = Rz P(2 ,3 ) ,  and I3 (k) 
W = P , 3  The overlap cqnditions are s a t i s f i e d ,  s o  F is represented by a 
function of one variable on the domin P(1,2)NT'IP(2,3)NT'IP(1,3)N. Next, let  I l ( k )  
R1 P(1 ,2 ) ,  I 2  (k) R2 = P(2,4) and 13 (k) = R3 = P(1,4) .  I t  follows from Theorem 
2 t h a t  F can be represented by a function of a s ing le  variable over 
P(1,2)NT'IP(2,4)NT'IP(1,4)N. Ebth of these dormins include P(1,2)N, s o  i n  b t h  cases 
the s m  voter is the d ic ta to r  o r  the anti-dictator .  TIE proof is completed with 
the obvious induction argument. 
The dis t inc t ion between whether a d ic ta to r  o r  an anti-dictator  reigns can 
be determined with a mntonic i ty  condition, such as a pareto condition, on s o m  
pai r  o r  even by specifying the  irrage of a s ingle  point. 
Comllary 2.2. a. Sugparje in addition to the assumptions in Comllary 2 .1 ,  it is 
known that F((cI>%>. . > c n ) N )  is in the P(lDn)  class companding to c l > ~ .  'l'k 
function F can be mpmsentsd by a dictator. 
b. kt p be a profile in P( 1,.  . n) N . If the assumptions of Comllary 2 . 1  
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am satisfied an]. F can be mwesented by a, tben, for a ~ y  (i,j), t2e P(i,j) 
image of F(p) &~~ wkthr k is a didator or an anti-dictator. 
These corollaries extend the  standard Arrow t h r e m .  The next corollary 
permits t ie  votes to emrge.  The m i n  feature demnstrated by Corollary 2 .3  is the  
f l e x i b i l i t y  offered by Theorem 2 by allowing each R j  to have mre than two 
elements. For this statement , let F (1,.  . , n) be the  set of a l l  complete, 
t rans i t ive ,  binary rankings of the  n a l ternat ives ,  even those with t i e s .  If A is a 
subset of (1,. . , n} , then an elernent of F ( A )  consists  of a l l  of the  rankings i n  
F (1 , .  . , n) with the  sm r e l a t i v e  t r ans i t ive  ranking - including possible t i e  votes 
- of the candidates i n  A. By admitting t ie  votes, the concept of a d ic ta to r  is 
weakened. So, let  g k ,  a limited d i c t a t ~ r o v e r  P ( i , j ) ,  be where gk is either 
constant valued over this pa i r ,  o r  where ci >cj is mpped either to c i > c j  o r  to ci = 
cj . A correspnding def in i t ion  defines a limited anti-dictator .  So, a l i m i t e d  
d ic ta tor  m y  not be able to g e t  outcomes bet ter  than, say,  ci >cj and ci = cj  . 
Corollary 2.3. kt ~ 3 ,  N22 , and F: (P(1,. . , n) )N --- > F (1,. . , n) be given. Suppose 
for each pair (i , j) , F satisf ies  tk irdependeme wndition 
: ( i , j ) )  - -  i , )  IE F is m ~ o n s t a n t  for eachpair, t k n  F ran be 
-presented by a function of a single variable that wrresponds tro e i t k r  a 
(limited) dictator or tro a (limited) anti-dictatror. 
Proof. This corollary is proved with the s m  kind of induction argumnt 
used i n  the  proof of Corollary 2.1. So, w e  only need to show t h a t  the new range, 
s a t i s f i e s  the  range overlap conditions. S t a r t  with R1 = F (1 ,2 ) ,  R2 = F ( 2 , 3 ) ,  and 
R3 = p1( 1,3  ) . We know tht the strict r a n k i m  given by P ( i  , j ) s a t i s f y  the  range 
overlap conditions. So, it suff ices  to consider a pa i r  withstrict ranking and 
another pa i r  with indifference. The set {cl >c2 , cl=c2 } n {q >5 , c3 >c2 } contains 
{cl >c2 >c3} and {cl=c2 >c3}. Each of these sets are i n  d i f ferent  p1 (1,3) sets. (See 
Figure 1. ) Likewise, the intersect ion {cl >c2 , cl=% } n {% >q , =q } contains 
{cl=c2 >c3 ) and {c1=c2 =c3 } ; each is in a d i f ferent  F'" (1,3) set. Thus, the  range 
overlap conditions are sa t i s f i ed .  By s y n n ~ t r y ,  the same conclusion holds f o r  any 
t r i p l e t  of indices. This completes the proof. 
Corollary 2.3 admits mny poss ib i l i t ies  ranging from a dic ta tor  tn a 
l imited d i c t a t o r  wbre ci >c  is mpped to i t s e l f  i f f  i< j ; otherwise it is rnapped to 
ci=cj. If  n=3, then t h e  image of F cons is t s  of t he  four  rankings {cl >c2 >c3, 
c1=c2 >c3 , c1 >c2=c3 , c1=c2 =c3 1. BY se l ec t ive ly   laxing t h e  nonconstancy condit ion 
on F, a l l  s o r t s  of o ther  s i t u a t i o n s  emrge  with d i f f e r e n t  f i e f d o m .  For example, 
we could have a d i c t a t o r  over P(1 ,2 ,3)  and a limited d i c t a t o r  over P ( 3 , 4 , 5 ) .  Such 
a d iv is ion  i n t o  fiefdoms works as long as no pair of candidates are shared by 
competing f i e f  doms . 
For g o d  reasons, the independence conditions f o r  s o c i a l  choice d e l s  
usually s a t i s f y  an implicit mnoton ic i ty  property; e .  g. , t h e  group's r e l a t i v e  
ranking of ci and c are determined on1 y by the voters  ' r e l a t i v e  rankings of these 
same two candidates. But, does such a t a c i t  assumption c o n t r i b  to t h e  
impossibi l i ty  conclusions? Why not  let  t he  j t h  voter ' s  r e l a t i v e  ranking o f ,  say ,  
cl and c2 a f f e c t  the  group's ranking o f ,  say,  and c3. (Such a condition 
captures s o m  of the f l avo r  of t h e  Hurwicz-Schidler  " kingraker" [ 101. ) . Corollary 
2.4 proves t h a t  nothing is gained from t h i s .  ALso, it shows tht t h e  re la t ionship  
between the domin  and range independence conditions need not  s a t i s f y  t h e  tacit 
mnotonic i ty  assumptions s tandard i n  the soc i a l  choice l i t e r a t u r e .  Indeed, the 
form of t h e  independence assumptions can change with the voter.  ( In  Corollary 
2.4a, if an i d e x  has a value g rea t e r  than 3 ,  then replace it with its reminde r  
{1,2,3) when d i v i d . 4  by 3. For i n s t m e ,  7 i s  replaced with 1, arid. 9 is replacw3. 
with 3. ) 
b m l l a r y  2.4. a. Let NS? ard F: (P(1,2,3))N -> P(1,2,3) be given. Let I j (k)  = 
P + + )  , j 1 2 3  1 .  N .  S~~ppase that F Is onto and sa t i s f i e s  tk 
indepmkme corditions F: IJ ->P(j, j+l). Thm is an index s (voter s )  s o  tha t  F 
can be repmsented by a function of a single variable, &. T k m  are only two 
possible ways to & f i m  g, . 
b. Let N12, -3, and F: (P(l,. .  ,n))N --> P(1,. . ,n) be given. For each 
k1,. . , N ,  let %(-) be a permrtation of tk irdices {I,. . ,N)  f o r  the lrth vobr, let 
Ij.e(k) be the set P(%(j) ,%(s)) ,  and let 1j.s = X,  U.s&) ,  j,s = l , . . , N .  If F 
satisfies tk idependeme corditions F: IJ --> P( j , s )  wkm F is ontn, tfien t h m  
is an index 0 (voter 23) so that F can be mpresserrted by a function of a single 
variable, &. There are only two pmsible ways to define go. 
Tr iv i a l ly ,  the overlap conditions are s a t i s f i e d ,  s o  t h e  coro l la ry  follows 
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imnediately from Theorem 2. The function o f  one variable need not  te a d i c t a t o r  
nor an anti-dictator .  For instance, i n  part a ,  i f  s=2, then one of the two 
possible defini t ions has g2 taking cj  >ck to cj+ >ck+ l ;  so ,  g(c1>c2 >c3 ) = c2 >c3 >cl .  
If the  range is replaced with F ( 1, . . . , n) and the  nonconstancy condition of F is 
relaxed, a l l  so r t s  of other poss ib i l i t i e s  are admitted. 
Z b  mioe of F and &rasi-dfc&toIs 
The next application of T h r e m  2 underscoI.es t h a t  F need not be a mpping; 
e. g. , it could be a correspondence w h e r e  R is the  power set of som other set. 
Secondly, it i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  w h i l e  F mst be represented as a function of one 
variable over the domin IlnI2nI3, it need not have t h i s  =presentation over th 
f u l l  dormin D. 
Ehnple. Let ~ i 2  and le t  F be a correspondence with dormin P(1,2 ,3 ,4)  N
withvalues i n  P(1 ,2 ,3 ,4) .  Let I j ( k )  = R j  = P ( j , j + l )  f o r  j=2,3,  and equal to 
P(2,4) f o r  j=3. If F s a t i s f i e s  the invariance conditions F: Ij-- > R j  , j=1,2 ,3 ,  then, 
according to Theorem 2 ,  F can be represented by a function of one variable over the 
dormin IlnI2 nI3. But, t h i s  domin imposes no I.estrictions on the re la t ive  ranking 
of cl and c2.  Thus, it is consistent to define such an F where the re la t ive  
ranking of cl and c2 is determined by, say, a m j o r i t y  vote. So, the re la t ive  
ranking of %, 5 ,  and c, rmst be' determined by a part icular  voter - F is 
represented by a function of one variable over the intersection of the equivalence 
classes IlnI2nI3 - but m j o r i t y  vote applies f o r  the ranking of (cl ,cz 3. 
Thi s  example and Theorem 2 explain why nondictatorial socia l  welfare 
functions so  often endow s o m  agent with considerable power. Altbugh the 
specified independence conditions mw not force a d ic ta to r  over a l l  of D, they m y  
force a d ic ta tor  to emrge over the  sets i n  IlnI2nI3 - he is a quasi-dictator  over 
the wble domin D. An i l l u s t r a t i on  of this is i n  a piper by Gibbard, Hylland, and. 
Weymwk [4] w h e r e  they s b w  t h a t  a related nondictatorial function ex i s t s  i f  a l l  of 
the  feasible sets include cl . As we now how from Theorem 2 , t h i s  is the general 
s i tuation.  
Flexibility in the of thz Dnmin 
Because the domin overlap conditions are specif ied in set theoretic 
terms, there is considerable freedom i n  the modelling. With this f l ex ib i l i t y ,  w e  
could examine som natural questions about rankings, such as those pioneered by 
Weymwk, concerning what happens when w e  relax assumptions of completeness, e tc .  
As long as the geomtry defined by these new res t r i c t ions  and equivalence classes 
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of rankings s a t i s f y  the  overlap conditions, the  usual d i c t a t o r i a l  conclusions 
apply. kt, ins-d of showing how s o m  of Weymarks's nice r e su l t s  are s u b u m d  by 
T h e o r e m  2 ,  I w i l l  emphasize o ther  kinds of d e l l i n g  f l e x i b i l i t y  admitted by this 
theorem. The f e a t w x  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Corollary 2.5 is t h a t  the sets IJ (k, I ) ,  
I j  (k,2)  need not be d i s j o i n t  f o r  al l  choices of k. This fea ture  admits f l e x i b i l i t y  
i n  the d e l l i n g  because I j  (k,  1) = I j  (k,2)  rmms t h a t  t h e  kttl voter has no 
influence over which R j  equivalence class is selected. (This is -use there is 
only one I j  (k) component f o r  Ij . This forces t he  kt tl voter  to have a constant 
value over this equivalence set, s o  he has no influence on the outcome of F : I j  -- 
> R j .  ) Corollary 2.5 i l l u s t r a t e s  how such d e l l i n g  can be used with Theorem 2. 
Part a asserts there does not e x i s t  a soc ia l  welfare function where the  f i r s t  agent 
determines tk group ranking of cl and c2 ,  the second agent determines the  ranking 
of c2 and c3 , while the th i rd  agent determines the ranking of cl and Q . Part  b 
asserts t h a t  i f  we w a n t  each agent to be involved with only two  pa i r s ,  there is a 
penalty t h a t  a sur jec t ive  F does not ex i s t .  
Corollary 2.5.  a. Let N=3 ard F:P(1,2,3)3 --> P(1,2,3) be given. Let U(k) = 
P ( C ~ , C ~ + ~ )  iff kj; otherwise let IJ (k, l)=Ij(k,2) .  Let R J = F ( C ~ , C ~ + ~ ) .  If F 
satisfies the independeme coditions F: IJ-- >RJ , j= 1,2 ,3 ,  tbzn F has a f ixced 
ranking for at least two of tk pairs. 
b. Let N12 ard let F:P(1,2,3)N-->P(1,2,3) be given. Sugpose for each k, 
one of the U(k)  equivaleme class is tk whole set P(1,2,3) while the otbx t w  
am IJ (k) = P(j. j+ l ) .  If F exists, it is corstant valued for at least t m  of t he  
pairs- 
h f .  a. The overlap conditions are s a t i s f i e d ,  s o  i f  F is nonconstant 
over two  o r  mre binaries,  then F can be represented by a function of a single 
variable. By assumption, t h i s  is impossible. This completes the proof of part a .  
Par t  b follows from t he  last sentence of Theorem 2. 
A standard way to obtain a poss ib i l i ty  theorem is to restrict the dormin. 
Corollary 2.5 shows t h a t  overly strict r e s t r i c t ions  can reintroduce d i c t a t o r i a l  
behavior. (See Theorem 4 . )  For instance i f  the  f i r s t  voter can vary between only 
c l > q , > %  and q,>cl>q,;  the second voter between cl>q,>c3 and c l > q > c 2 ,  and the 
t h i r d  voter between cl >c3 >c2 and c3 >cl >c2 , then Corollary 2.5 proves t h a t  this 
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e i t h e r  w i l l  not  avoid impossibili ty a s se r t ions ,  o r  F is constant over two pa i rs .  
Such a r e s u l t ,  where ce r t a in  voters  are concerned only a b u t  c e r t a i n  outzoms,  
contains the  s p i r i t  of Sen's tfreorem on liberalism [21]. In Sen's f o m l a t i o n ,  two 
agents have the  privileged s t a t u s  to determine t h e  r e l a t i v e  ranking of  c e r t a i n  
a l te rna t ives  - pmsumbly their own - w h i l e  tk o the r  a l te rna t ives  are represented 
only through a weak pareto condition. The following version of Sen's tfreorem 
i l l u s t r a t e 5  how the  s e t  E, introduced i n  t h e  beginning of this sec t ion ,  is used. 
Definition. kt F: P(1,. . , n)N -- > P( 1 , .  . ,n) be given. F satisfies the m d r  m.mto 
audition for {cj, if P((cj>cL)N) = cj>% F ( ( % > c ~ ) ~ )  = Ck>Cj. N ~ W ~ Y ,  
when everyone has the relative ranging of thse two alternatives, Preserve5 
this relative ranking. 
The weak pareto condition is not  an independence condition, but ,  with the  
appropriate E set and Theorem 2 ,  it does def ine  an Ij s e t .  Thus, its connection 
with the  standard A r r o w  theorem becomes apparent - b t h  r e su l t s  form t h e  s w  kind 
of axioms. 
k m l L a r y 2 . 6 .  kt ~ 3 ,  N22. Assum that Al, 4,  A, am subsets of the indioes 
{ l , .  . ,n) strch that ( A j  122 any two of these sets h v e  pmcisely one index in 
oomnon. T k m  does not  exist an F:P(l , .  . ,n)N --> P" (1, .  . ,n) smh that: 1) t h  
P" (Aj ) image of F is no~yx)nstant and it depends solely upon the jt h voter 's 
rankhgs of the Aj cardidate, J=1,2, and 2) F satisfies ~ J E  w s . k  pareti0 cordition 
for the pairs of altmmtives in 4. 
I f  Al and 4 have mre than one e l emnt ,  in c o m n ,  then, an argumnt  l i k e  
t h a t  given in Corollary 2.5, shows t h a t  such an F doesn ' t  exist. An induction 
argument, similar to t h a t  used i n  Corollary 2 .1 ,  extends t h i s  s t a t e m n t  to a la rger  
number of Aj  sets. 
h f .  Without lo s s  of genera l i ty ,  assum t h a t  cl is the commn e l e m n t  
of Al and A2, c2 is the  e l e m n t  i n  4 and 4 ,  w h i l e  5 is in 4 and A l .  Let  E = 
(c3>cl)NU(cl>c3)N. S e t  E is a proper sukse t  of P(1,3)N requir ing a l l  voters  to 
agree a b u t  the  r e l a t i v e  ranking of these two a l te rna t ives .  The following sets are 
d e f i n e d o n E .  L e t  Il(1) = P ( 1 , 2 ) ,  I2(2)  = P(2 ,3 ) ,  P ( j )  = P(1 ,3 ) ,  a n d a l l  o ther  
I k ( j )  sets equal to Dj. The interdependency given by set E af fec ts  only the  I3 ( j )  
sets - a voter 's  ranking mt agreed with t h a t  of t h e  other voters. The overlap 
principle,  with s e t  E l  is s a t i s f i e d ,  so  it follows from Theorem 2 t h a t  i f  such an F 
e x i s t s ,  then it can be represented by a function of a single variable. N m l y ,  the  
ranking of one par t icular  voter  determines the  outcoroe of F. This contradicts  the  
f i r s t  assumption, s o  t h e  theorem is proved. 
Incidentally, this pmof i l lus t ra tes  t h a t  aruf interdependency condition 
nrodelled with an E sa t i s fy ing  Theorem 2 is not su f f i c ien t  to escape the  penaltie5 
of A r r o w ' s  theorem. By examining the  proofs of Theorem 2 and 4 i n  Section 5,  one 
can extend the  def in i t ion  of E s o  tht it is "ks t  possible". In this manner, one 
can characterize t h e  kinds of interdependency conditions t h a t  admit a poss ib i l i ty  
theorem. 
So f a r ,  a l l  of w examples are based on the georoetry of P ( l , . .  , n ) .  This is 
not necessary. To i l l u s t r a t e ,  Corollaries 2.7,  2.8 show t h a t  everything extends to 
function spaces. The function spaces are the spaces of u t i l i t y  functions, and the  
m t i v a t i n g  example is the  &el of Kalai, Mueller, and Satterthwaite [ 11 I .  L e t  Ec, 
be the  posi t ive orthant  of a c-dimnsional Euclidean space, c s ,  and let  the  swce 
of utility functions be U={u: Ec,-->E: u is a s m t h  function, and a t  each point i n  
Ec, the  gradient of u points to the in te r io r  of Ec,. 1 These u t i l i t y  functions a r e  
concave, mnotonic, and they do not admit a sa t i a t ion  point. 
A c lass ica l  object ive is to f ind a group u t i l i t y  function; to f ind an 
F: UN-- > U  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  c e r t a i n  properties. If F ex i s t s ,  its *e, I+ , defines a 
complete, binary, t r a n s i t i v e  relat ionship over Ec, . If f o r  x E Ec, , I+ (x) is 
defined i n  tens of ( u l ( x ) , . . , ~ ( x ) ) ,  then F s a t i s f i e s  the def in i t ion  given k l o w  
f o r  pointwise binary independence where S = Ec,. Indeed, by s e t t i n g  S = Ec, i n  the  
next defini t ion,  w e  recover the  condition used by Kalai, b l l e r ,  and Satterthwaite 
to show t h a t  such an F leads to a dictator .  But, can a d ic ta torship  be eliminated 
by using other cbices of S, say, by m u i r i n g  a g r e m n t  only over s o m  smll 
subset of p i n t s  r a the r  than a l l  of Ec,? Instead of defining a ranking over a l l  of 
Ec,, how a b u t  l e t t i n g  t h e  u t i l i t y  functions define such a ranking only over a 
specified set S? 
&finition. Let  S be a subset of Ec,, a d  let P(S) be the set of all mnplete, 
binary, transitive rankings on tfie set S .  Let F,:W->P(S) be given. F, sat i s f ies  
t h  pointwise, biznzy ixr3epemkmx? condition over S if tfre following cordition 
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holds. For for  all pairs of points xl ard + fIwn S, and for  any two choioes 
uj=(ulJ ,. . ,I@), 3=1,2, fimn W, if u1(&)=l12 (G), k=1,2, then F, ( u l ( 5 ) )  = 
Fa (S 1, k=l,2- 
Soroe restrictions need to be impsed upon the s e t  S. 
Mini t ion .  A set of point, S in &+, is mmmnotanic if for  x ,  y E S, som 
oolllponent of x is Larger than the c o ~ p o ~  ammnent of y, ard socoe anannent 
of y is larger than the C O ~ ~  -t of x. A set S is f u l l  if i) t h m  
is a t  least one mnm>mtonic paFr of points in S, and ii) for  each wnm>mtonic 
pair of points, t h ~  is a third point i n  S so that the t r ip le t  is wrmpmtonic. 
I t  is natural to W s e  a mnotonicity condition on F such as requiring 
when la1 (x) = la2 (x) and ul ( y ) a 2  (y) that  the relative r a n k i w  of x and y with 
F, (la1 ) cannot rank y lower than F, ($ ) . A less res t r ic t ive way is to define the 
jt h agent's independence se t s  for  points {xi, +} as Ii k (j , 1) = {U in U: the level 
s e t  of u passing through xi passes below +.} while the definition for  Ii l k ( j  , 2 )  is 
tha t  the level s e t  passes above + . Notice that  Ii , j (k, 1) = Ij I i (k, 2 ) .  The 
independence condition is 
3 . 2  for  eachpai r  of mmnoton ic  points (2q,xj) fromS, F : I i l k  - ->  P(q, +). 
ComlLary 2.7. L e t  S be a f u l l  subset of &+ w i t h  a t  least  t h ~ ~ =  points. Suppose 
F,:W --> P(S) satisfies the p i n k b e  binary independeme condition, t l ~  
~~ cordition 3.2, ard tht F, is not oorstant over at  least two 
mnmnotnnic z a i n  of points of S. Fs can be repns=nted b a function of a single 
variable tht cornponds to eithr a dictator or an anti-dictator. 
Can a nondictatorical F, be constmcted with different kinds of economic 
in fomt ion?  For instance, the price mchanisrn depends, i n  part, on the gradients 
of the u t i l i t y  functions. The next definition permits gradients and other 
information to be used by replacing a point from S with a subset determined by a 
point in S. In th i s  way, it describes a "general binary independence condition" 
tha t  permits F, to be defined i n  terms of any kind of differential  i n fomt ion  
coming from la as well as the behavior of la a t  neighboring points. Indeed, the 
definition of the "B sets"  even prmits the ranking of two points to be b e d  on 
i n f o m t i o n  corning from elsewhere i n  Ec+. 
Ikfinit ion.  kt S be a subset of B+. F,:W-->P(S) satisfies th gemmd hinary 
aMdi tim if for a l l  finite subset of points A= {xl , . . , x, } . q E S , 
and dl nl ard Uz f n m  UN , the f o l l o u h g  d t i o r r s  b l d :  
i) %rp: a m  nxlerqrty, pairw;se disjoint sets W ( j , k ) ) ,  j=l,-. ,N ,  k l , . .  , t ,  
in 16c+ such t h a t  i f  q and + a m  mmmmtonic, then, f o r  each j, any point f m  
I P ( j , i )  ard any point fmin IP( j ,k)  are mmmmtonic. 
ii) For each pair (xi,&) f m m  A, if ulj and G, both agme on I P ( j , i )  ard 
BA(j,k), j=l,.. ,N, t k m  F , ( u ~ )  a d  F,(L$) wind& on a d  xj. 
A pointwise binary independence condition is a special  case where BA (j , k) = 
{ I .  Another special  case would be where F, is based on the values of u and its 
derivatives at a point. Here, (with a s l i g h t  d i f i c a t i o n  of the defini t ion) open 
sets about each point i n  S rn used to define the germ of the u t i l i t y  functions. 
The c b i c e  of EY(j,k) can vary with the point, s o  d i f ferent  types of i n f o m t i o n  
can be employed. For instance, a t  xl w e  m y  use the value of the u t i l i t y  function, 
and a t  x2 and x3,  the gradient of the  u t i l i t y  function. The independence 
conditions t h a t  replace the  usual mnotonici ty condition. are defined in the 
following mnner. For a t r i p l e t  A={xl ,x2 ,x3}, let  Ij (k,  1) be the set of a l l  
u t i l i t y  functions f o r  the kth agent t h a t  have level sets passing through BA(k, j) 
but below BA (k, j+l) , while Ij (2) are the u t i l i t y  functions with a level  set  passing 
through BA(k,j) but above BA(k,j+l). The independence condition is 
3 . 3  f o r  a l l  t r i p l e t s  of n o m m t o n i c  points F: Ij --- > P (xj , xj + ) . 
Comlliuy 2.8. L e t  S be a full suhset of B+ w i t h  at  least thme points. 
Suppxe that F, : W-->P(S) satisfies a geneml b m  i n d e p d e m x  wndition, the 
indepdeme wndition 3.3, ard t h a t  F, is not amstan t  valued o m  at least tm 
m~m~mtronic pairs. F, can be r e p ~ e n t e d  b a ftolction of a single variable that 
armsponds to either a dictator or an anti-dictator. 
Corollaries 2.7, 2.8 i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  the problem of d ic ta to r i a l  behavior is 
not imluced by w h t  h l f o m t i o n  is used, ht by tk division of informtion.  In 
these corol lar ies ,  the d i c t a t o r i a l  conclusions are d i r e c t  consesuences of an 
attempt to create  an F, t h a t  preserves mmtonic i ty .  
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Out1i.m of tlre Proof. As with Corollary 2 . 1 ,  t h e  proof is by induction 
over triplets. L e t  A= {xl ,  +, x3) be a triplet of poin ts  t h a t  are n o m n o b n i c .  
A l l  t h a t  needs to be proved is t h a t  t h e  domain over lap  conditions are s a t i s f i e d .  
The proof is out l ined  f o r  c=2; t h e  extension to c > 2  is imnediate. The proof of t h e  
domain over lap  condit ion is indicated i n  Figure 2. Because t h e  sets Bk ( j ,  i) are 
n o m n o t o n i c ,  with some choice of t h e  indices ,  they can be arranged in a fashion 
s i m i l a r  to t h a t  given in this sketch. Now, f o r  A = {xl ,x2 ,x3) ,  it is easy to see 
why I l ( j , Z ) n I 2 ( j , l )  meets both I 3 ( j , l )  and I 3 ( j , 2 ) .  I n t h e  f i r s t s k e t c h ,  therea2-e 
three l eve l  sets f o r  t h e  sm u t i l i t y  funct ion u. The f i r s t  l eve l  set passes 
t h r o u g h B A ( j , l ) ,  above BA(j,2),  ht belowBA(j,3).  This is possible because of t h e  
norumnotonicity assumption. Such a u is i n  I1 ( j , 2  ) . To ensure u is i n  I 2  ( j , 1) , 
t h e  second l e v e l  set passes through BA (j , 2 ) .  Because c=2 and because l eve l  sets 
cannot c ross ,  this l eve l  set is forced to be below both BA ( j  ,1) and BA ( j  , 3 ) .  There 
is still f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  t h e  design of u to have a t h i r d  l eve l  set passing through 
BA(j,3).  Again, geomtric cons t ra in ts  fo rce  this l e v e l  set to be above B A ( j , l ) ,  s o  
it is i n  I3 ( j  , 2 ) .  I t  only remins to show the re  is a d i f f e r e n t  u t i l i t y  funct ion 
from I l ( j , Z ) n 1 2 ( j , l )  t h a t  is i n  I 3 ( j , l ) .  This is s b w n  i n  t h e  second sketch where 
t h e  f i r s t  l e v e l  set passing through BA ( j  ,1) now passes above both BA ( j  , 2 )  and 
BA(j,3).  This forces  t h e  leve l  set passing through BA(j,2) to be below BA(j , l )  
( f o r  geomtric reasons) and BA ( j  , 3 )  (because it is i n  I 2  ( j  ,1) ) . These two 
r e s t r i c t i o n .  f o r c e  t h e  l eve l  set passing through BA ( j  , 3 )  to have t h e  proper t ies  of 
mmbership f o r  I A  ( j  ,1) . Similar  arguments apply to s b w  t h a t  t h e  domin  
independence conditions hold. The conclusion now follows from Theorem 2. 
SCUE &Lications to 6 c o d c s  
We now use t h e  independence conditions to characterize th i n f o m t i o n a l  
r equ i r emnt s  of economic prooedures. To see t h e  idea ,  suppose we wnat to know 
whether we can c o n s t m c t  a group decis ion pmcedure, based on binary compr i s ions ,  
t h a t  always is i n m u m  to a Dutch Book procedure. (See, f o r  instance,  [22]. ) Thus, 
we w a n t  to know whether t h e  ordering of t h e  p a i r s  is of any consequence. Can such 
i n f o m t i o n  be combined s o  it always y ie lds  a t r a n s i t i v e  ranking of t he  
a l t e rna t ives?  If t h e  answer is yes, t h e  procedure def ines  a s o c i a l  cbice funct ion 
t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  c e r t a i n  independence condit ions,  s o  Theorem 2 m y  apply. 
Alternat ively,  f o r  a given economic procedure, w e  m y  want to determine whether 
c e r t a i n  kinds of m i a l  i n f o r m t i o n  a m  adequate to capture aspects  of t h e  
p m e d u r e ;  i . e . ,  of what use is this partial i n f o m t i o n  with respec t  to t h e  
procedure? If the  cbice of p a r t i a l  i n f o m t i o n  defines independence conditions, 
Theorem 2 may apply. For instance, when analyzing a solut ion concept f o r  a 
standard t rading o r  exchange d e l  amng three agents,  can we can reoover aspects  
of the  solut ion by knowing what would happen i n  al l  the  possible binary t rades  
m n g  the  three pairs of agents? Suppse  externalities are introduced into a 
c la s s i ca l  a l locat ion  procedure. Is the  i n f o m t i o n  a b u t  how pin of 
externalities e f f e c t  the  classical solution of any use when considering the total 
effec t?  
To i l l u s t r a t e  this l i n e  of thought (and to demnstra te  another f ea tu re  of 
the  overlap pr inc ip le) ,  consider the  aggregate excess d e d  function f o r  a simple 
t rading society with neo-classical u t i l i t y  functions. For a given pr ice  vector ,  
can w e  obtain qual i ta t ive  information a b u t  the  aggregate excess demand function 
from the  re l a t ive  d e d  f o r  the  pairs of c o m n d i t i e s ?  To be mre spec i f i c ,  a t  a 
given price,  the  components of the  aggregate excess demand function determine an 
ordinal  ranking of the  c o d i t i e s  i n  a natural  fashion; the  larger the demand f o r  
a c o d i t y ,  the  mre favored it i s .  I t  is reasonable to expect t h a t  i n f o m t i o n  
a b u t  this ranking can be obtained by finding f o r  each pair of comoodities, 
considered a t  these sam prices, which one is the  mre desired. Such a problem can 
be analyzed in several  ways ; I '11 use Theorem 2. The outcorn is t h a t  the  
information a b u t  pairs can be unreliable - even f o r  a s ingle  agent. 
Suppose the  three c o m d i t i e s  are {cl ,  Q ,  Q} .  The qual i ta t ive  
i n f o m t i o n  w e  seek is the  d k e c t i o n  of the aggregate excess d e d  function. So, 
let the  two R i  , J classes ,  {Ri s J (ci >c . ) , R i  J (cj >ci ) }  be determined, respectively,  J 
by whether there is a posi t ive  d e d  f o r  ci o r  f o r  cj .  I t  is easy to show t h a t  
the  range overlap conditions are sa t i s f i ed .  The domain f o r  each agent is t he  set 
of neoclassical u t i l i t y  functions. The kth agent is given an i n i t i a l  e n d o m n t  
(Wkl, WkZ, Wk3), Wkj>2.. For a s p e c i f i e d p r i c e ,  ( p l , & , ~ ) ,  pj>O, the  I i , J ( k )  sets 
are defined i n  the  following m e r :  Ii , J (k,ci >cj ) ) is the  set of a l l  u t i l i t y  
functions s o  t h a t ,  when the  remining c o d i t y  is held f ixed,  the  excess d e m d  
function at the  price (pi , pj ) has a net  t rade between 1 and 2 units  in favor of ci . 
If the  approach of comparing binary i n f o m t i o n  gives qual i ta t ive  information a b u t  
the  aggregate excess d e d  function, then, f o r  the  given i n i t i a l  e n d o m n t s  and 
pr ice ,  F:{U}N-->n{Ri , J }  s a t i s f i e s  the  independence condition t h a t ,  f o r  each pair 
( i ,  j) , F: I J -  R J .  Clearly, F is not determined by one agent, s o  the  f u t i l i t y  
of such a binary approach follows from Theorem 2 once w e  es tabl ish  t h a t  the  domin 
overlap conditions are sa t i s f i ed .  
I t  is t r i v i a l  to show t h a t  the domin overlap conditions are sa t i s f i ed .  
Indeed, a n e w  fea ture  arises ; the intersection of each 11 I 2 class with each I 2  , 3  
class mts b t h  1183  class. Thus, unless r es t r i c t ions  are impxed on the  c lass  
of u t i l i t y  functions, no aget~t s a t i s f i e s  the rtstrictivo domin conditions, s o  the  
last sentence of Theorem 2 applies. To indicate the basic ideas, I w i l l  out l ine 
why I l , 2  (k ,c l>+)  n I z P 3  ( k , + > % )  mets Lnth 1 1 1 3  classes. In the  plane z=Wk3 in 
E3 consider the  circle of radius 1.5. In this plane, the  line passing through the  
i n i t i a l  e n d o m n t  with n o m l  vector (pl ,pz)  mts the  circle i n  precisely two  
points. Choose t h e  one where cl A t  this point,  construct  a level  set of the 
u t i l i t y  function such t h a t  the  f i r s t  two c o m n e n t s  of its gradient is a posi t ive 
m l t i p l e  of (p, , I + ) .  Use a similar construction f o r  a level  set of the u t i l i t y  
function i n  I2,3 ( k , + > c 3 ) .  SO f a r  we've specified t w o  level  sets a t  two d i s j o i n t  
points using only p a r t i a l  i n f o m t i o n  a b u t  the gradient.  The same construction 
f o r  I l r3  (k) speci f ies  two mre mints .  A l l  four points are dis jo in t ;  indeed, they 
do not  even l ie  i n  the same plane, and only the last two are on a line passing 
through the i n i t i a l  e n d o m n t .  So, it is t r i v i a l  to construct a u t i l i t y  function 
with a level set sa t i s fy ing the  point i n f o m t i o n  a t  the  f i r s t  two points and a t  
e i t h e r  one (but, c l ea r ly  not b t h )  of the remaining four points. This completes the 
proof. 
Because no agent s a t i s f i e s  the res t r i c t ive  domain conditions, such an F 
doesn't e x i s t  even f o r  one agent - such i n f o m t i o n  is not r e l i ab le  even to 
determine a s ingle  person's d e d  function. The s m  f a t e  holds f o r  any choice 
of F based on similar i n f o m t i o n .  This can be i l l u s t r a t e d  with the  next example 
t h a t  uses a kind of i n f o m t i o n  often considered i n  economics. Suppose F is a 
function of the  gradient of the u t i l i t y  function a t  x j  where the imge of F 
s a t i s f i e s  the  range conditions. Instead of using the  mnotonici ty condition given 
i n  Corollaries 2.7 ,  2.8,  suppose the related domin independence conditions are 
Ij (k, 1) = (u in U: the  jth component of the  gradient of u is la rger  than the other 
t w o  oomponents) where Ij (k,2)  is the set where some other component is larger than 
the j t h  conqmnent. Again, not only are the domin overlap conditions s a t i s f i e d ,  
but no agent s a t i s f i e s  the  res t r i c t ed  domin conditions. Thus, such an F cannot be 
defined even f o r  one agent. 
bnt i rgemy lbbles i n  Statistics 
Theomm 2 can be used with issues from statistics. For instance, by 
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t rea t ing each data point as a "voter", i f  follows immdia.tely from Theorem 2 tha t  
there  i s n ' t  a s t a t i s t i c a l  roethod yielding a t rans i t ive  ranking of three o r  mre 
alternatives tha t  respects binary comparisons. As another statistic question 
s u k u m d  by T b r e m  2 ,  consider the problem of c o l l a ~ i n g  of contingency tables to 
obtain the  mwginal probabil i t ies.  To describe the  problem, s u p p s e  a new vaccine 
is proposed to cure the  c o m n  cold. T h i s  vaccine is to be tested in  Evanston and 
i n  Ann Arbor. A t  each s i t e ,  a test group and a control  group axe used and the 
probability of a patient  regaining health is complted. L e t  x, and xA denote, 
respectively, the  difference between t k e  values f o r  the  t w o  groups as masured at  
Evanston and a t  Ann Arbor. So, x, >O means tha t  i n  Evanston the  n e w  vaccine had a 
better success r a t e  than the standard t rea tmnt .  Finally, suppose the  test resul ts  
f r o m  both locations are sen t  to a central  location and aggregated where y is the 
d i f f e ~ n c e  between probabil i t ies of success with the vaccine and with the standard 
t rea tmnt .  We want to compare signs of the t r i p l e t  (x,  , XA , Y) . Sings011 s ycuadox 
is when the signs (+, +, -) occur; the vaccine was successful b t h  i n  Evanston and 
Ann Arbor, tut not i n  the aggregate. 
Simpson's paradox is an annoying consequence of the combinatoric rules of 
conditional probabil i t ies.  Can som other measure be invented to avoid S i m o n ' s  
paradox? Namely, can w e  f ind a mpping F = (h , pA , p) , depending on a l l  of the 
informtion,  where the outcorn assures a l l  sign combinations except (+,+,-) and 
- , - , + In this manner, the  n e w  m u r e  avoids the  p i t f a l l  of S i m o n ' s  paradox. 
(See [5] f o r  som masures. ) Now, w e  want this masure to be useful on its own a t  
each s i t e ,  s o  we want the sign of h , C I A ,  p to depend, respectively, only on the 
sign of x, . x, , and y. This defines a binary independence condition, and it is 
easy to show tha t  the range overlap conditions are sa t i s f i ed .  Using the  resul ts  
given in [ 161 concerning Simpson's paradox, it follows t h a t  the  "one voter" 
s a t i s f i e s  the domin overlap condition, but not the  restricted domain conditions. 
( A l l  signs fo r  (% , XA , y) are possible. ) Hence, according to the last sentence of 
Theorem 2 ,  such a measure does not exis t .  
l%e Rwge ibditim: Social &ice Amctians 
Theorem 2 offers  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  choice of the  range, o r  outcome space. 
Because the range overlap conditions are i n  a set theoretic form, the  range could 
be any space - a function space, a space of probability d i s t r i h t i o n s ,  a lo t t e ry ,  
su t se t s  of al ternatives,  etc. I decided to i l l u s t r a t e  the basic ideas with a 
familiar  &el - socia l  choice mappings. L e t  the  candidates ( c l , .  . ,c,) be given, 
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le t  Aj, j = l , .  . ,p,  be a s u t s e t  of these candidates, let  FS = {Al,. . ,$) be the  set 
of feasible sets of A ,  and let R be the set of a l l  nonempty subsets  of the  
candidates. A s o c i a l  choice correspondence, F: FSx{P(l,. . , n )  IN--->R, assigns to 
each f eas ib l e  s e t  and preference p ro f i l e  a nonempty subset  of t h e  f e a s i b l e  set. 
N m l y ,  f o r  A j  in FS and x i n  P ( l , . .  ,n)N, F(Aj,x) is a nonempty subset  of A j .  F 
s a t i s f i e s  the  condition of inde-ndence of infeasible a l t emt i ves  i f  f o r  Aj  i n  FS, 
and i f  f o r  x and y i n  P ( 1 , .  . ,n)N that agree on Aj  (they a r e  i n  t he  s m  P(Aj) 
c l a s s )  , then F (A j  , x) = F ( A j  , y) . A soc ia l  choice correspondence F is stsict ly 
nomnstant over Aj  i f  t h e  imge of F(Aj ,-) has a t  least two d i s j o i n t ,  nonempty 
s u t s e t s .  F s a t i s f i e s  the  choice axiom i f ,  f o r  a l l  x, F(Aj , X I  = F({ l , .  . ,n) , x ) M j .  
The def in i t i on  of a correspondence of a s ingle  variable,  a d i c t a t o r ,  and an 
a n t i d i c t a t o r  are the  obvious ones. 
The difference between a soc ia l  welfare function and a s o c i a l  choice 
funct ion is t h a t  a s o c i a l  welfare function determines the  g m u p  ranking of the  
a l t e rna t ives ,  while the  social choice function s e l e c t s  only the  set of "k t "  
candidates. So, i f  a s o c i a l  welfare function e x i s t s ,  t he  r e l a t e d  s o c i a l  choice 
funct ion s e l e c t s  the top ranked a l te rna t ive .  This mans t h a t  t he  s o c i a l  choice 
funct ion is zaliaed by the  s o c i a l  welfare function. An important theorem by 
Hansson [6] spec i f i e s  w h a t  kind of feas ib le  s e t s  pennits a s o c i a l  welfare function 
can be constructed to r e a l i z e  a given soc ia l  choice function. Thus, whenever his 
conditions are s a t i s f i e d ,  there is a re la t ionship  between r e s u l t s  f o r  s o c i a l  choice 
and s o c i a l  welfare. While the conditions given below can be used to invoke 
Hansson's theorem, t h e  conclusions a r e  proved d i r e c t l y  to i l l u s t r a t e  how Theorem 2 
includes soc ia l  choice mdels. 
Comllary 2.9. For A = {cl,. . ,q,) w k  -3, let th set of feasible sets hl& 
A and all tm element subsets of A kt F be a social cbioe o o ~ p o d e m e  that 
satisfies t& codition of indepexdeme of infeasible alternatives, th cbice 
axium, a d  is strictly mmr~tant over th p a i ~  of altiernatives. F can be 
mpzesented a function of a single variable. 
Of course, Corol lary 2.9 could be d i f i e d  to obta in  a r e s u l t  with the 
f l avor  of Corollary 2.4 and some of the  other  s t a t e m n t s .  
Proof. As with Corol lary 2.1,  the proof is by induction. Choose th ree  
candidates,  say {cl, q ,  c3). A s s m  t h a t  A j  = {c j ,  C ~ + ~ I .  Let I j ( k )  = P ( j , j + l ) ,  
Overlap t heo~ms - &in rrestll ts Page 24 
and define R j  to be { { c j , A j S ) ,  { C ~ + ~ , A ~ ' ) )  where A j '  is the complemnt of Ak i n  A. 
(So, i f  n=3, R1 = {{c1,c3), {%,%)).) I t  follows from the condition of 
independence of infeasible al ternatives and the choice axiom t h a t  F: Ij-->RJ. I t  is 
easy to show t h a t  the sets Rk s a t i s fy  the range overlap conditions. For instance, 
asah in n=3, RlfW = {{cl ,031, {c2 ,0311 fl {{c2 , c l l ,  {CJ , c l ) )  = {{%I,  {cl)  
{cl , c3 ) , {c2 ,% 1). The f i r s t  tw sets are i n  dif ferent  R3 s u k e t s  . From t h i s ,  the 
conclusion follows from Theorem 2. 
Gibtrud - Sattert)aefte 
A s  a last i l l u s t r a t i on  of Theorem 2, 1-11 give a proof of the Gibbard - 
Satterthwaite theorem t h a t  d i f fe r s  from the standard mtkd depending on the 
dis t r ibut ion of power. For simplicity of exposition, restrict attention to three 
alternatives.  (In mch  the same manner as described f o r  the ea r l i e r  corol lar ies ,  
the resul ts  exknd to all values of n13. ) Recall t h a t  i f  A = {c , c2 , % ) is the set 
of candidates, then a voting scheme is a function F: {P( 1 ,2 ,3)  )N --- > A. For xj  E 
P(1,2 ,3) ,  ci >jck i f f  t h i s  is the  ~ l a t i v e  ranking of the two candidates i n  xj .  A 
voting schem is m i p l a b l e  i f f  there ex i s t s  x,  y E {P(1,2,3)1N t h a t  d i f f e r  only 
i n  the j t h  component and F (y) > F (x) . The j t h  c o m n e n t  f o r  y, y j  , represents 
the  j t h  voter 's m i s~p re sen t a t i on  of his t rue  ranking. We say t h a t  j mnip l la tes  F 
a t  x with yj.  
Comllary 2.10 (The G i ~ S a t ~ t e  ~ I T M ) .  kt F be a mting s c k  f m  
(P(1,2,3)}Nto {cl, %, 5 3  ub=mthemngeof F h  onto. F i s e i ~ d i c t a t o r i a l  
or mnipllable. 
M f .  Assum F is not rmnipulable; we show it is d i c t a b r i a l .  For the 
pair 4 , j  = {ci ,  cj},  let  R i  , j  = {{c,, A ' i ,  j ) ,  {cj , A ' i ,  j ) ) .  For instance, R 1 , 2  = 
{{c, , CJ 1 ,  {% , % I ) .  The range overlap condit.ion5 are sa t i s f i ed .  Corollary 2.10 
follows from Theorem 2 once we show tha t  the Ii . j (k) sets are P (i ,j ) . This proof 
i l l u s t r a t e s  how these impl ic i t ly  defined independence conditions are extracted from 
"level  set" and mno.tonicity properties of F. To emphasize the ideas, the proof is 
divided i n b  three lemnas. F i r s t ,  note t ha t  F- 1 (c ) # 8 f o r  a l l  j. 
L e m  1. If F (x) = cj , and i f  x = (xl , . . , ) varies only i n  the kth 
component where t h i s  variable, yk , is i n  the same P ( i  , j) class ,  then F remins  i n  
the  sane R i  $ J  class. If when yk changes P ( i ,  j) classes ,  the imge of F changes 
R i  ,J classes,  then the change is mnobnic;  e .g.  , i f  y, mves from P(cj  >ci) b 
P(c i>c j ) ,  then the imge of F mves from {cj,ck) to {ci ,ck) .  
Proof. Without loss of generality, l e t  k = 1. Suppse the f i r s t  part of 
the l e m  is fa l se  because the M e  of F changes R i  j classes when this voter 
changes to yl ' where both xl and yl ' are in  the s m  P ( 1,2)  class. If this voter's 
re la t ive  ranking is c i > c j ,  he can rmniprlate the outcorn of F a t  x with y, ' ;  
otherwise he can mnipulate the outcorn of F a t  (y, - , x;! , . . , +) with x1 . BOth 
contradict the assumption tha t  F Is not m i p r l a b l e .  Similarly, i f  changing tk 
P ( i , j )  classes has the reversed effect  on the i w e ,  then ei ther  one way, of tk 
other, the f i r s t  agent can manipllate tk outcorn. If t h i s  agent's relative 
ranking is ci >cj , then F is rrranipulated a t  x with y,; otherwise F is manipdated a t  
(yl,xz , .  . via xl. 
&finition. The change of a ranking xi to yi is called a level set cIw@ 
with rtzspect to cj i f f  fo r  each choice of k,  ck >C in q i f f  the same relative 
ranking holds in  yi . 
In other words, in  a level s e t  change, a l l  of the candidates ranked above 
c j  in  q are also ranked above cj  in  yi and vice versa. So, c j  remins a t  the sam 
level and a l l  candidates originally above (below) remain above (below). For 
instance, c l  >c2 >q and c2 >cl >c3 are level s e t  changes with respect to q , but not 
with respect to c j ,  j=1,2.. 
L e m  2. If F (x) = c , and y differs  from x only i n  the kt h voters ranking 
which is a level s e t  change with respect to c j  , then F (y) = c j .  
Proof. Assum the l e m  is fa l se ,  and tha t  F(y) = c i .  Because the kth 
agent rnade a level set change, t h i s  agent's relative ranking of ci and c j  remins 
the sm. Thus, this voter can e i ther  manipulate F a t  x with y-x o r  a t  y with x-y. 
L e m  3. For each i and j ,  F : I i I j - ->Ris j .  
Proof. If t h i s  l e m  were fa l se ,  there would be a profile x where F(x) = 
c,,  and a profile,  y, in the same P(1,Z)N class as x, w h e r e  F(y) = Q .  Becawe we 
can go from x to y with a series of individual ranking changes i n  the sam P(1,2) 
c lass ,  it follows from km 1 tha t  there is an i n t e d i a t e  profile,  z ,  in the 
sm P(1,Z)N class ,  such tha t  F(z) = q .  Firs t ,  assum tha t  a l l  rankings in  x with 
c l  >c3 have the ranking cl >c, >% or  Q >cl > q .  If this i s n ' t  so, it can be achieved 
with cl level s e t  changes. According to Lem 1, i f  P(1,Z) invariant changes a l t e r  
the outcorn to c3, it is due to P(1,3) changes f o r  a sukset of these voters; l e t  
V 1 , 3 '  be the indices of these voters, and let z '  be the new profile. (Notice, 
these are level s e t  changes where c l > q  b m s  >cl. ) Now, to change the 
hmge f r o m  c3 to c2 , cer ta in  voters keep t h e i r  rankings in the same P (1,2) class, 
but they mt change P(2,3) f r o m  % >c2 to Q >c;, . Let V2 , 3  be the indices of these 
voters and le t  y be the  profi le .  We can assume tha t  V1.2  and V2 , 3  are dis joint .  
T h i s  is because the voters with the x ranking of c2 >cl >c3 have the  wrong P(2,3) 
ranking to mke t h i s  change. For the  other voters i n  V l  , 2 , the P ( 1,3 ) change 
resu l t s  i n  cl>c+. If this doesn't change the F image to cl  (the only poss ib i l i ty ) ,  
then this voter wasn't needed i n  V l 1 2 .  If it does, then, according to L e m  1, the  
next P (2,3 ) change cannot change the outcorn to %. 
Change y to w by using a Q level  set change with a l l  indices i n  V112. 
According to L e m  2, F(y) = F(w) = Q .  Profi le x di f fe r s  from w only f o r  the  
rankings of the  V2 , 3  voters. So, the changes from x to a only involve P (2,3) 
changes i n  the sane P (1,2 1 and the sam P (2,3) classes. Thus, according to L e m  
1,  F (w) is in {cl, % I .  T h i s  contradiction completes the  proof. 
Corollary 2.10 follows from Lemna 3 and Theorem 2. (Of  course, w e  could 
have streamlined the proof by s b w i n g  , f o r  example, t ha t  the V i  D j sets are 
singletons.)  Notice tha t  the drive f o r  each agent to mxirnize the  outcome of F 
i s n ' t  needed; we only used the associated mnotonicity f o r  F. Consequently, the 
essence of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem extends to si tuations outside of 
s t ra teg ic  mnipulations as well as the other extensions admitted by the f l ex ib i l i t y  
i n  the choice of the range t h a t  is admitted by Theorem 2. Finally, it is worth 
noting t h a t  in [9,17], the  level  sets defining the  mpssage correspondences are 
based on in tegrabi l i ty  conditions. This involves " L i e  bracket conditions"; they 
masure the change, o r  d i f fe ren t ia l ,  of one vector f i e l d  with respec t  to another. 
& examining the usual mt iva t ing  examples f o r  the L i e  bracket, you w i l l  f ind a 
strong relat ionship with the proof of Lemna 3. T h i s  is not coincidental; such a 
construction occurs whenever the independence conditions f o r  d iscre te  rmdels are 
impl ic i t ly  defined; e. g. , a related arguroent is i n  the last paragraph of the proof 
of the f i r s t  part of Theorem 2. This kind of argument can be ats t rac ted to form 
the  discre te  version of the  L i e  bracket condition. 
Theorem 2 can be extended by a l t e r ing  the domin and the  range overlap 
conditions. There are many ways this can be done; several create  interest ing 
theories of independent in teres t .  Rather than attempting to be complete, I ' l l  
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i l l u s t r a t e  the  basic ideas with s o m  p x s i b i l i t y  theorems. In mch the sm 
fashion other  extensions , say ,  to quasi- transi t ive o r  acyclic  rankings can be mde. 
The f i r s t  extension is to d e l  "indifference". The def in i t ion  is based on 
the  georoetric proycrt.ies i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure  1. The key fea ture  is t h a t  i f  an 
agent is indifferent  between cl and c, , then his (c;! ,q) ranking uniquely 
determines his (cl ,  c3) ranking. This deprives h i m  of the  freedom la vary between 
P(1,3)  classes t h a t  is essen t i a l  to prove Theorem 2. Consequently, w e  should 
expect other voters to have a say  i n  the outcoroe. This happens. 
Definition. The h m i n  overlap d t i a m  w i t h  hdiff- for the k.h voter 
admits added s e t s ,  I J (k ,3) ,  j=1,2,3. For each j ,  tbe added set is disjoint f m  
each of the tm original Ij sets. The ckurain overlap cordi t ion  for this new set is 
t b t ,  for each permrtation (a ,b , c )  of (2,3) and s = 1,2,3, Ia(k ,3) f lP(k ,s )  mets 
precisely one Ic (k) set, Ic (k,u) ,  w k . m  s=3 i f f  u = 3. FwAkmmm, if 
Ia(k,3)nD(k,u)  meets Ic(k ,v) ,  w3, then P(k,u)nIc(k ,v)  meets a l l  three of the Ia 
sets. Call I j (k ,3)  the imWferwm? set. 
Theorem 3 extends the  version of Arrow's Theorem t h a t  admits preferences 
with indifference. To generalize the  idea of s-uential d i c t a b n - ,  w e  need a 
stronger condition on the  range s e t s .  
Definition. Assume t h a t  each R j  , j=1,2,3, I n s  tm elemmts. Assume for each 
permrtation (a,b,c) of (1,2,3) t h a t  a m  four sets in RefW; t m  of them 
s a t i s f y  th mnge overlap corditioxs and each of th= 0 t h ~  tm ~t both RC sets. 
Both of th lat- tm - of th= fom RalfWu a d  Ra2fWv for SOOE  permta tat ion 
(u,v) of (1,2). The range set. R j ,  j=1,2,3, are said to s a t i s f y  th= flexible r m  
overhp c o d t i o n s .  
Most of the  choices of R j  used i n  this paper s a t i s f y  the  f l ex ib le  range 
overlap condition. This is t rue  f o r  P ( i  , j) as well as the  sets {cj ,Aj ' I .  TIE t e r m  
"flexible" refers  the  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  the  range classes similar to t h a t  admitted by 
the  dorwin overlap conditions. The r e s t r i c t i o n  allowing R j  to have only two sets 
is not necessary. 
h m m  3. kt N L 2. kt M =  @':I)-> R : the Ij classes s a t i s f y  the dolllain 
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overlap conditions w i t h  M f - ,  the R j  classes s a t i s f y  the flexible range 
averlap oordi t ia rs ,  anl F: IJ-->RJ is m n  amstant for a t  l e a s t  two val- of j.) 
a. Them is a n F E  W t h a t c a n m t  bemqmsentedtyafrnrJtion'of orre 
var iable  over IlnI2N3. 
b. Suppose F E H is n o t  a function of a siogle variable. T b m  exists a 
pzwmtation of indices, (B(l) ,  B(2) ,. . ,B(s)) ,  s<N,  a d  rmppims go ( i  ):% ( i  )->R 
w i t h &  f o l l a w b g ~ y .  If xp(l) 6! IJ(B(1),3),  then& R j  imge of F is 
detiermirdbthe -of go(,)). M i m l y ,  i f x o ( , ,  E I j(B(a) ,3) ,  a r - l , . . , ics ,  
*(,+I) 6! Ij(B(*1),3), RJ image of is b &(,+l)- T h e  
are two possible cbices for each go (,). 
An unusual example i l l u s t r a t i n g  Theorem 3b is w h e r e  the  P ( i , j )  outcom of 
F:(P(1,2,3)-IN-->P(1,2,3) is d i c t a t o r i a l l y  determined by the f i r s t  voter i f f  her 
ranking is not indifference. If she is indi f ferent  a b u t  s o m  pa i r  P ( i , j ) ,  then 
this ranking is determined by t he  second vo-r 's P(i+ 1, j+ 1) ranking. Other examples 
could involve u t i l i t y  functions, etc. 
Theorem 3 demnst ra tes  t h a t  several  voters can help determine the outcom 
of F when the  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  the  domin is curtai led.  This is accomplished here by 
adding s e t s  to the admissible domin t h a t  don' t  s a t i s f y  the domin overlap 
conditions. In other words, there are s i tua t ions  where Arrow's t h r e m  doesn 't 
apply because it is I ~ X  m s t s i c t i v e .  A standard way to obtain poss ib i l i ty  t h r e r m  
is to create the  r i g i d i t y  i n  the  domin by subtsacti tg from the domain by 
imposing res t r i c t ions  on what are admissible preferences. T h e o r e m  4 characterizes 
these domin res t r ic t ions .  Essent ia l ly ,  Theorem 4 states t h a t  the overlap principle 
captures the  bundary between poss ib i l i ty  and impossibility conclusions. 
To rmtivate Theorem 4 ,  r e c a l l  t h a t  ptzzling phenomna I b r i e f l y  mntioned 
a f t e r  Corollary 2.5. C e r t a i n  domain res t r i c t ions  permit p s s i b i l i t y  t h r e n s .  I t  
seem reasonable to expect t h a t  with stricter r e s t r i c t ions ,  d e l s  permitting even 
mre voter part icipat ion w i l l  r e su l t .  This need not happen; the stronger 
restrictions can force a r e tu rn  to an impossibility conclusion! For instance, 
with axioms nxlch l i k e  those studied by Kalai, Mueller, and Satterthwaite,  Donaldson 
and Weymrk [2] obtained a p o s s i b i l i t y  theorem with an independence condition t h a t  
d e l s  a form of "free disposal  of g h "  . Yet, when they changed the  independence 
condition i n  a natural  but s l i g h t  manner, an impossibility theorem now emrged. To 
see why behavior l i k e  this occurs, consider Arrow's theorem where voter 13 can 
assum any ranking e m p t  cl >c2 >q . According to Theorem 4,  we obtain a 
p x s i b i l i t y  theorem. Now consider what happens i f  w e  fur ther  restrict 13's rankings 
to (cl >q >% , q >cl >c2 ). NOW, a d i c t a t o r ,  other  than 13, is obtained. This is 
because with the  original  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  the  Id (O) classes are the  usual P ( i , k )  
classes minus the  one specif ied ranking. Because only this one ranking is missing, 
the  domin overlap conditions cannot be s a t i s f i e d ,  s o  as Theorem 4 a s s e r t s ,  a 
poss ib i l i ty  conclusion holds. But, by imposing the  stronger r e s t r i c t ions  on 13's 
rankings, a new set of I j  (O) classes emerges. One class still is P(1,3)  , but the  
two n e w  I j  equivalence classes are singletons - the  e n t i r e  set. Theorem 2 applies  
because the  stronger r e s t r i c t ions  (which correspond to mre relaxed independence 
conditions) create a n e w  division of independence classes i n  the  domin t h a t  
s a t i s f y  the  domin overlap condition. The next def in i t ion ,  which is needed f o r  
Theorem 4 ,  captures this impl ic i t  behavior. 
Definition. S- I IJ (k) , j=1,2,3, satisfy th nstricted domFin overlap 
oorditions for I&. A lestrictian for t h  lrth voter is a plroper subset,  C, , of I (k) 
= Il(k)nIz(k)nP (k). A nstriction C, ~ 1 i c i t W  defiDes a new set of 
inf~113tim.d equivalence classes I Jj (k) } , j= 1,2,3, if x E IJ (k, s ) % iff 
x E Jj (k,s)%, j = 1,2,3, s = 1,2. 
As an example, suppose I i ~ d ( k )  = P ( i , j )  = ( P ( c i > c j ) ,  P (c j>c i )}  and % = 
(cl >c2 >c3 , c1 >c3 >c2 , q >cl >q 1 .  (These are regions {A, B, C) i n  Figure 1. ) % 
implici t ly defines the  overlap classes Ji , j (k) = I i  , j (k) f o r  ( i ,  j) = ( ( 1 , 3  ) , 
(2 ,3 ) ) ,  and J1,2 is t he  singleton equivalence class of the  total set. In other  
words, because the  restric l ion % forces one of the  I1,2 (k) sets to be empty, this 
class could be replaced with a singleton. Notice t h a t  with the  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  
nei ther  the  or ig inal  nor the  impl ic i t ly  defined classes s a t i s f y  the  domin overlap 
conditions. This is because J1 ,2 (k ) fWS3(k)  = J 2 , 3 ( k ) G  = { ( c l > ~ > q ) ,  { c l > q > ~ ,  
q > c 1 > c 2 ) ) ,  SO there a ren ' t  two sets i n  this intersect ion where each meets both 
J 1 ~ 3  (k) sets. 
Theomin 4. S-e the infonmtional equivalence classes ard the division of the 
range for given D and R satisfy tk overlap prbiple. Assure mtrictions are 
imposed an at least one of th voters that satisfies th mstricted domin overlap 
corditiom, say voter 1. Assume that all of tk hplicitly defined infonmtiod 
equivaleme classes gemrated by C1 either fail to s a t i s f y  th overlap amtitiom 
or they have only tuo classes w i t h  tuo disjoint nomupty sets, say J j ( l ) ,  j=1,2, 
& a t  l e a s t  tuo of lh four  sets in J l ( l ) (Uz( l )  enpty. T k m  exists a 
fumbion F f m m  t b  xtdiricted k i n  of D to R that satisfies th indepembme 
conditions F: I j ->Rj  , j=1,2,3, uh.m F js no-mtant f o r  a t  k t  tuo values 
of j and F cannot be mwerrted as a f-on of a single variable. 
In other words, as long as the res t r i c t ions  don' t  implici t ly define a n e w  
c lass  of i n f o m t i o n a l  equivalence classes t h a t  require,  via Theorem 2,  a 
d ic ta to r i a l  s i tua t ion ,  then a non-dictatorial F ex i s t s .  
Comllary 4.1. L e t  n=3 and Ii, J (k) = Ri , j  = P ( i ,  j ) .  If C1, th mstrictions on 
voter 1, are s ~ h  t t C1(Ui, j( l ,s)  # B for all (i, j ) ,  s = 1,2, tkn them exists a 
mawk from this ~ t r i c t e d  omain t h a t  oanrrot be mpmsented by a furrction of a 
single variable. 
Exaarple The res t r i c t ion  C1 = {cl >% >Q,  % >c2 >cl )  admits a socia l  welfare 
function t h a t  is not governed by an (ant i )  d ic ta tor .  This is because each P ( i , j )  
set meets C1. On the  other hand, the res t r i c t ions  C1 '  = ( c l > % > % ,  c 2 > c 1 > 5 }  
cannot avoid a d i c t a t o r i a l  s i tuat ion.  This is because C1 '  meets only one set i n  
each of P(2,3) and P( 1 ,3) .  As a resu l t ,  both of these classes can be replaced with 
a singleton equivalence class of everything. The overlap conditions are s a t i s f i e d  
and Theorem 2 holds. 
Even though Theorem 4 admits a poss ib i l i ty  conclusion, the  resul t ing  F 
need not be a &el of part icipatory d e m r a c y ;  the  remining conditions still 
impose sharp res t r i c t ions  on which F's are admitted. To see t h i s ,  suppose 
res t r i c t ions  are imposed only on the f i r s t  voter where C1 = P(1,2,3) - {c1>%>c2) 
(region B i n  Figure 1). If F is not determined d ic ta to r i a l ly ,  then the  f i r s t  voter 
mt influence the  outxome of a t  least trm pairs .  This is because i f  the  voter has 
no influence over a pa i r ,  then the  associated F inplicitly d e f i n e s  the associated 
informtional egui~lence class as a singleton. If t h i s  is t rue  f o r  two pai rs ,  
then the  newly defined classes t r i v i a l l y  s a t i s f y  the  domin overlap condition, and. 
Theorem 2 applies. Now, the  constraint  C1 permits f 1exibilit .y of mvemnt  in the 
P(1,3) and P(2,3) c lasses ,  s o  a variat ion of the argument f o r  Theorem 1 shows t h a t  
voter  1 determines the outcorn of these pairs .  Thus, the defini t ion of F is thrust 
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upon us; the f i r s t  voter (an t i )  dictatorial ly determines the  P( 1,3) and the P(2,3) 
outcome. With one exceptional case, the outcorn is e i ther  P ( 5  >cl )W(c3 >c2 ) = 
{C,D), o r P ( c 1 > c 3 ) W ( ~ > c 3 )  = {A,F). I ne i t he r  s i tuat ion,  the P(1,2) outcorn can 
be determined in any desired m e r  by the voters, say, with a majority vote. The 
one exceptional s i tuat ion is when the f i r s t  voter has the ranking c2 >5 >cl .  Here 
the P(1,3)W(2,3) w e  is either the anti-dictatorial  outcorn {B) , or  the 
dic ta tor ia l  {E) - which one occurs uniquely defines b w  this voter determines the 
imge of F. Thus, i f  the f i r s t  voter has tk ranking ~2 >cl , he determines the 
P(1,2) o u k o ~ ~ .  Otherwise the P(1,2) irnage can be determined by a mjo r i t y  vote 
(or by any other mxms ) of the  remining voters. 
With this construction, it is easy to W e  other si tuations tha t  could 
occur with the appropriate domain restrictions. For instance, si tuations can 
occur where tk f i r s t  voter uniquely determi= the P(1,2) and P(2,3) ou t co rn ,  
the second determines the P(1 ,4) ,  P(1,5) outcorn,  . . . .  If this process does not 
uniquely determine the F outcorn i n  P ( 1, . . , n) , then other voters can make the 
f i n a l  determination. Such a construction results from an i t e ra t ive  application 
of Corollary 4.2. 
Comllary 4.2. a. kt N 1 2. Suppose th inforplational equivaleme classes and th 
division of the range for given D and R satisfy the overlap principle. Assuue 
mstrictiom, C1, am imposed on voter 1 and that voter 1 satisfies the mtr ic ted  
doroain overlap mnditiors. Suppose C1 admits a permrtation (a,b,c) of (1,2,3) so 
that Ia(l)rrIt,(l) oontairs the tsn> sets uh.m each mets both Ic(1) sets. If F 
cannot be llepzesented by a fumtion of om variable, t k m  the f i r s t  voter 
deter ' t b R a a n d R b o u t c o m .  
b. kt k-2, ad s- that mt r i c t iom C1 ad C, am given. S-e for 
two different permrtations (a(k),b(k),c(k)), that I a ( k ) ) n P ( k ) )  oontains th 
mquired t w o  sets that ~t b t h  IC (k)  sets hrt th 0 t h  sets in this intersection 
do not. If F is m t  a function of a single variable, t h  for one cbioe of k, t h  
kCh vpter detezmimzs th Ra(k)  and th Rb(k) -. 
hbn bnditiom - &m ~XBOIY 
I've already pointed out tha t  the informtion used by each voter could 
chmge; fo r  instance, one voter's domain could be ordinal rankings, a second 
voter's domain could be based on a prot-wbility distr ibution,  while a third is given 
by u t i l i t y  functions. The next feature I w i l l  i l l u s t r a t e  is tha t  each i nde ~ndence  
c lass  of each voter could represent a d i f ferent  type of i d o m t i o n ;  the goal is to 
determine whether the interaction m n g  the  f e a t m  are compatible. In this 
mnner, f o r  instance, one could examine resul ts  of the  type shown by SameLson 
where a t ransfer  of i n i t i a l  e n d o m n t s  can adversely a f fec t  the f i n a l  al location.  
I decided to i l l u s t r a t e  this feature  by recapturing sonre of Hurwicz and 
Schmidler 's (HS) nice resu l t s  a b u t  inferior  Nash equil ibria.  (In t h i s  way we 
r e l a t e  HS 's resul ts  to Arrow's t h e o r e m .  ) 
HS studied g a r r s ,  o r  al location processes with a f i n i t e  number of 
al ternatives,  where, f o r  each p rof i l e  , there is a Nash equilibrium which a lso  is 
Pareto op t im l .  Such an al locat ion procedure is acceptable [10,p. 14471. HS sbwed 
t h a t ,  f o r  t w o  agents, an acceptable al location function mt be d i c h t o r i a l ,  but 
tht this same conclusion does not hold f o r  three o r  mre agents. Yet, they 
proved t ha t  a non-dictatorial solution f o r  mre than t w o  agents requires a 
"kingmker". With three players, the  role of the  kingmaker is to determine which 
of the remining trx, agents is to be the dictator .  Because r r ~ ~  objectives are to 
i l l u s t r a t e  Corollary 4 .2 ,  1-11 show kre  only why the, dictatorship occurs f o r  N-2. 
(The proof and the c o m n t s  m t iva t i ng  Corollary 4 .1  and 4.2 suggest the, reasons a 
kingmaker occurs. ) 
Consider al location procedures with two possible outcorn, {a,b}, and t3wo 
agents. The range space is not jus t  the two outcorns; it is each outcome 
associabd with b w  each agent honestly ranks the al ternatives.  For instance, 
typical  outcomes are {a,a>lb,b>2a},  {a,b>la,b>2a}, and {b,a>lb,a>2b}. The f i r s t  
outcome implies t ha t  a is the select& al ternat ive ,  a is the  f i r s t  agent-s  top 
ranked al ternative,  and it is the  second agent's bottom ranked al ternative.  The, 
second and th i rd  outcomes do not occur berause of the  preto condition. For 
instance, i n  the second outcorn, both agents prefer an available a l ternat ive ,  b. 
This leaves 6 outcomes t h a t  do s a t i s fy  the  pareto condition, and they are 
represented i n  Figure  3. In this t r iangle ,  the  edge to the l e f t  represents the  
f i r s t  voter 's t rue  ranking and defines t h  two R1 classes,  th edge to the r igh t  
represents the  second voter ' s  t r ue  rankings and defines the two EP classes, while 
the  bottom edge denotes the  selected al ternative and determines the two R3 classes. 
Because tk mapping, f , has only four variables, there are four irnage points, so  it 
is not obvious w h e t b r  t h e  range overlap conditions are sa t is f ied .  By tb pareto 
assumption, f rmst have an i w e  in regions 3 and E. Because there is an o u t c o r ~  

f o r  each prof i le ,  there is an inrage point i n  (C, D) and i n  (A,  F). If the hmges 
are (A, Dl, then, t r i v i a l l y ,  t h e  f i r s t  agent is a dic ta tor .  Equivalently, i f  
they are (F, C), then the  second agent is a dictator .  For e i t he r  of the  remining 
t w o  cases, the  range overlap conditions are sa t is f ied .  
The domain fo r  each agent, I&, is represented by a similar t r iangle ,  but 
there is a s l i g h t  difference i n  the interpretation. The bottom edge, dividing 
the  equilateral  t r iangle  in to  t w o  r igh t  tr iangles,  corresponds to this agent's two 
s t ra tegies  - w i l l  she state a o r  b is her top ranked al ternative? Of course, this 
depends on the choice of the  allocation function and on her opponent's strategy. 
Therefore, this axis corresponds to what appears to be her top choice based on her 
strategy choice. This defines the 13 (k) classes. Obviously, the  Ij ( j )  classes 
agree with the R j  classes,  j=1,2. The remaining equivalence class f o r  each agent 
consists on what appears to be the t rue  belief of the opponent. For instance, the 
point ( a l ,b> la ,b>2a)  represents the f i r s t  voter using a s t ra tegy to achieve a, when 
his t rue  f i r s t  choice is b, and it appears tha t  the second agent's t rue  f i r s t  
choice a lso  is b. Such points are not admitted both under the  Nash and Pareto 
assumptions. Thus , the  representation of the  t r iangle  holds. A w n t  the 
al location function, f :  (a ,  b)2 --- > (a, b) , to define the  trapping F: Dl@ -- > R ,  i n  the 
natural m e r .  N m l y ,  F map I j  ( j )  to R j  , j= 1,2 ,  and f maps the  s t ra tegies  to the 
R3 class. By construction, F: I J - - > R J ,  j=1,2,3. If f is not d i c t a to r i a l ,  w e  've 
already shown t h a t  the  range overlap conditions are sa t is f ied .  The domin overlap 
conditions remain. 
If f is not d i c t a to r i a l ,  there are only two  choices f o r  the  irmge set of 
F. Without loss of generali ty,  assuroe it is (A,B,C,E). We need to use the Nash 
and Pareto conditions to determine what sets are, and are not in G. By the  Pareto 
condition, (B,E) = ( ( ak , a > lb , a> 2b ) ,  (&,b>la,b>2a))  E G. Because of the Nash 
condition, regions (C, Dl E C1. I t  is obvious why D E C1. To see why C = 
{a, , b> l a ,  a>2 b) E Cl , note t h a t  the  first voter using the  s t ra tegy to ge t  b resul ts  
i n  a .  If by changing s t ra tegy,  the  agent muld ge t  b, the  or ig inal  outcom 
wouldn't be a Nash equilibrium. Thus, C also is an admissible strategy.  Similar 
arguments show t h a t  C1 contains a l l  of the regions excxpt. (b, , a> lb J  b>2a) because 
this would change the outcorn to b, and this is a personally worse outcom. 
Likewise, = {B,C,D,E,F). 
Based on the res t r i c t ions  G,  Corollary 4.2 holds. Consequently, e i ther  f 
is dic ta to r ia l ,  o r  (according to Corollary 4.1) two of the R j  classes of F are 
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determined by one agent. Obviously , these tuo classes cannot be R 1  and R2 , s o  one 
of them rmst be R3.  This returns us to the  d ic ta to r i a l  s i tua t ion  because this 
agent determines the  {a,b} outcom. 
For t w o  agents and severa l  al ternatives,  the ideas remin the  same. If 
there  are mre than two agents, there are differences i n  the  construction. 
S t i l l ,  based on what has been shown, intui t ion suggests (and supporting d e t a i l s  
prove) t h a t  when a voter determines the  outcome f o r  t w o  classes, one could 
determine which of the other voters prevails,  and then t h i s  designated voter 
selects m n g  tw classes. This last voter is a d ic ta tor ;  the f i r s t  is a HS 
kingmaker. 
R%@ -lap 
If the range overlap conditions are not sa t i s f i ed ,  f l e x i b i l i t y  is 
introduced in to  the  range. A poss ib i l i ty  theorem emrges. 
h m l l a r y  4.3. In tbe sta- of Theorem 4, assm tht tbe dormin o w z l a p  
oordi t iom am s a t i s f i e d  and a t  least txm voters s a t i s f y  tbe -trick3 domain 
oordit iom. Suppose tbe ~.ange overlap c d t i o m  am mt sa t i s f i ed  becam, for 
soue parmrtation (a,b,c)  of (1,2,3), t h m  am not txm sets in R a m  in d i f f e m n t  
sets of Rc. 
 BE exists a mapping F:D-->R satisfying tbe hdepedeme oorditio~s 
F: U->Rj, j=1,2,3, tht canmt be =-tied as a function of a single variable 
over 11mf-iP- 
Outline of the proof. Assum t h a t  h t h  R11T'IR2 and Rl2fRz2 meet both R3 
classes. Because the range overlap conditions are not s a t i s f i e d ,  either both 
R l  and R 1 2 W  are i n  the  s m  R3 class, o r  a t  l e a s t  one of t h e m  meets both 
R3 classes. The f i r s t  cannot occur. For instance, suppose both intersect ions 
miss the R31 class. That is {R31m11}m2 and {R31fR12}Mi21 are empty. This 
contradicts the  assumption t h a t  a t  l e a s t  one of the  R31m1j classes nust meet 
both R2 classes. In the  l a t t e r  se t t ing ,  i f  a l l  four sets meet tk two s e t s  i n  
R 3 ,  then let the  first agent's ranking determine tk R 1  and R2 outcom by mpping 
I j ( 1 , k )  to RJk, j=1,2, k-1,2, and let the R3 outcome. be determined by any desired 
metbd;  say a m j o r i t y  vote, o r  the  second voter 's ranking of this s e t .  The 
remining s i tua t ion is where one of the  sets, say R12 fX2, meets R3 but not m 2 .  
F i r s t ,  suppose there is a set i n  I1 (1) nI2 (1) t h a t  meets only one of the  I3 se t s .  
With a relabell ing of the  indices, w e  can assm tha t  I1 (1,2)  nI2 ( 1 , l )  mts only 
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13(1,1) .  'I'kn, let the  F be defined by having I j ( l , k )  mpped to R J k  f o r  j=1,2,  
k 1 , 2 .  If t he  f i r s t  v o k r ' s  ranking is in I3 (1 ,1 ) ,  then the  irmge is R31. 
Otherwise, let t he  second voter ' s  choice of I3 (2, k)  be mpped to R3 k .  Final ly,  
suppose a l l  sets i n  I1 ( 1) nI2 ( 1) meet both I3 ( 1) sets. The sam def in i t ion  of F 
applies.  
The purpose of this sec t ion  is to pmve the  m i n  theorem. 
k n m  4. kt IJ (k) , j=1,2,3, s a t i s f y  the dcxmin overlap mndit ion.  For each 
permrtation (a ,b,c)  of (1,2,3) ,  each the selx in I a ( k ) m ( k )  met a t  least one 
I= (k) selx. 
Proof. Supmse fa l se .  Without lo s s  of genera l i ty ,  assm t h a t  
11 (1,1)nI2 ( 1 , l )  does not meet I s ( 1 ) .  Namely, (11 (1 , l )nIz  (1,1)}nI3 (1, j) = @ f o r  j = 
1,2. In turn ,  this mans t h a t  11(1,1)f113(1,j) can ' t  mset I 2  ( 1 , l )  f o r  j=1,2. This 
contradicts  t h e  domin overlap asswaption. 
b f  of Theorem 2. Let Lj {k: f o r  s 1 k,  there  is an % '  i n  a Ij(s) 
class s o  t h a t  F (x1 ' , . . ,+ , . . XN ' )  changes R j  classes as xk changes Ij (k) classes}. 
N m l y ,  this is a s i tua t ion  w h e r e  when only the  kth voter  changes c lasses ,  t h e  R j  
outcom changes. F is non-constant over a t  least two sets Rj, s o ,  fmm the  range 
overlap condition, f o r  a t  least two choices of j , Lj is nonempty. 
Suppose there are a t  least two indices i n  tk union Uj Lj. Without. loss  of 
general i ty,  assume t h a t  1 E L1 and 2 E Lz . For this to occur, voters  3 to N, m y  
need to be i n  spec i f i c  Ij (k) classes , j= 1,2. According to t h e  l e m  , these voters  
can s a t i s f y  both conditions sirmltaneously. Hold these domin points  fixed. For 
voter  1 to be i n  L1, x2 ' nust be in a spec i f i c  11 (2) c l a s s ,  say  11 (2 ,u) .  Likewise, 
f o r  2 to be i n  Lz, x l '  rmst be i n  I z (1 ,v )  f o r  a spec i f i c  choice of v. For k 1 , 2 ,  
choose the  13 (k,B(k))  class s o  t h a t  I 2  ( l , v )n I s ( l , I3 (1 ) )  mts both Il(1) classes and 
11 (2, u) n13 (2,B (2) ) mts both 1 2  (2) classes.  According to t he  domin overlap 
conditions, this is possible. 
According to the construction, as + changes I k  c las ses ,  t h e  irmge of F 
changes Rk classes ,  k 1 , 2 .  Assum t h a t  Rk ' is t he  p a i r  of irmges of F caused by 
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t h i s  change of + , k= 1,2 .  According to the  construct ion,  a1  1 o u t c o r n  i n  R l  ' fB2 ' 
occur with appropriate choices of x, and x, . But, accoxding to the  range overlap 
condition, two sets i n  t h i s  intersect ion mt d i f f e r e n t  R3 classes. This forces 
t h e  R3 imge to vary even though each + remains i n  a f ixed  I3 (k) c l a s s ,  k-1, . . , N. 
This contradict ion proves t h a t  each Lj has only one index, say  1. 
To complete t h e  proof , we need to show that  f o r  any choice of x, , k 2 ,  . . , N, 
t he  R j  W e  of F(x, , . . , x,,) depends only on which Ij (1) c l a s s  contains x,. I f  
f a l s e ,  then tkre are {xk ' I ,  C+ " 3 ,  k12, s o  t h a t  F ( x l ,  x, -, . . ,XN ' )  and 
F (x, , x2 " , . . , x,,") are i n  d i f f e r e n t  L j  classes. By holding x ,  f ixed and going 
through the  various pe rmta t ion  of interchanging xk ' with + " , the  irmge of F rms t 
change R j  classes. This forces an index other  than 1 to be i n  L j  . This 
contradict ion completes t h e  proof. 
Next, ue show t h a t  t he re  are only two w a y s  g, can be defined. bsm the  
imges are R j  , i=1 ,2 ,  and c h s e  the indices on the  range sets s o  t h a t  F ( I l ( 1 ,  u) ) 
= Rl,, u=1,2, and t h a t  Rl, ruR2,  is i n R 3 ,  but  not inR3, .  Thus, R11m1m32 is 
empty. To define t h e  1 2  ( 1 ,  v) imge, note there is a choice of v s o  t h a t  
1 1 ( 1 , l ) n I z ( l , v )  meets b t h  I3(1) classes.  L e t  v' be t he  o ther  index. Then, F = gl 
rmst m p  IZ(1,v ' )  to R2,. If  not ,  t h e n F m s t  m p  IZ(1,v)  to R2, .  Because 
I1 (1 , l )nIz  ( 1 , ~ )  meets b t h  13 (1) c lasses ,  it follows from the  invariance property 
of F t h a t  R l  , n R 2  , meets b t h  R3 classes.  This contradict ion proves t h e  asser t ion .  
The determination of t he  I3 ( 1) i m g e  is done in t he  sm fashion. Note t h a t  t h i s  
proof shows t h a t  the  imge of gk cannot be constant valued over any Rj. Thus, each 
Ij (k) rmst have two d i s j o i n t  elements. 
I t  remins to prove t h e  l a s t  sentence of Thwrem 2. S u p m e  voter 1 always 
satisfies the  domin overlap condition f o r  al l  permta t ions  of (1,2,3)  and both 
perrmtations of (u ,v) .  This mans t h a t  in t he  a r m n t  of t he  preceding paragraph, 
t he re  are two choices of I z ( l , v ) ,  and each choice gives rise to t h e  contradiction. 
Thus, F cannot be defined. Next, assume t h a t  voter 1 determines the  outcome of F,  
b u t  one of the  Ij (1) c la s ses ,  say  I3 ( I ) ,  cons is t s  of only one equivalence c l a s s .  
The same ar-nt as given above shows t h a t  the  W outcorn w i l l  vary. This crea tes  
a contradict ion because gl (I3 (1)) is only one R3 class. (On t he  other  hand, if a 
r e s t r i c t i o n ,  C, , is imposed on I(1) = I1 (1)nIZ (1)W (1) t h a t  remves one of the 
fou r  s e t s ,  then gl is well defined. I f  C1 has only two sets from I1 but  each 
Ij (1 , s )  , j , s = 1,2 ,  then a non-dictatorial F can be defined. ) 
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Proof of Theorem 3. F i r s t  we establish t h a t  there  are choices of F tht. 
can not be expressed as a function of a single variable over the  total domin. So, 
assume the domin and range sets are specified whem the  m s t r i c t e d  domin 
conditions are s a t i s f i e d  f o r  agents 1 and 2. F u r t h e m r e ,  assum t h a t  the  indicing 
is such t h a t  R11T\R21T\R31 I @ .  We w i l l  define an F t h a t  is a function of the two 
variables,  xl and x2 from Ij to Rj, j=1,2,3. 
As shown i n  T h e o r e m  2 ,  them are only t w o  ways to define a roapping gk from 
{Ij (k, 1) , Ij (k,2)  ] to R j  . For k = 1 ,2 ,  l e t  gk be one of these choices. Define F in 
the following IMnner. If xl B Ij (1,3)  , then the R j  outcome of F is given by the R j  
imwe of g l .  If xl E I j ( 1 , 3 )  and x2 B I j ( 2 , 3 ) ,  then the R j  imge  of F is the R j  
imge  of g2. If xl E I j ( 1 , 3 )  and x2 E I j ( 2 , 3 ) ,  then the R j  image of F is R j l .  
I t  remins  to show t h a t  F is well defined. If either agent 1 never is 
indi f ferent ,  o r  i f  when agent 1 is indif femnt  over a l l  sets, agent 2 is not 
indi f ferent  over any s e t ,  then there is no d i f f i cu l ty  with the  def in i t ion  of F. 
The potential  problems are on the  complement of this subset  of the domin. To 
start, supmse i f  agent 1 is indi f ferent  over one set, say,  she is i n  I1 (1,3)  , and 
she isn  't indi f ferent  over one other set, say I 2  (1, u) , u 1 3. According to th 
domin overlap conditions, agent 1 is i n  I 3  (1, v) , v # 3 ,  and I 2  (1, u)  nI3 (1, v) mets 
a l l  three I1 (1) classes. In tu rn ,  t h i s  forces the  R2 and R3 imges (determined by 
agent 1) to be such t h a t  R2MI3 mets both R1 classes. ( I f  not ,  then, gl is not 
well defined f o r  agent 1. This is because i f  agent 1 is i n  12'(l,u)nI3 (1,v) she 
still can vary between the  two I1 (1, w) classes, w # 3. Now, i f  the irmge contains 
only one R1 c lass ,  this forces gl to be constant over {11(1,1) ,11(1,2))  - which 
leads to a contradiction.) The choice of R1 class  is determined by agent 2. 
The remining s i tua t ion  is i f  both agents are indi f ferent  over s o m  Ij 
c lass ,  say 11. The sare argwoent given i n  the  preceding paragraph shows t h a t  if 
one of the  agents is not indi f ferent  over some other Ij c lass ,  then there is 
f l e x i b i l i t y  in the  choice of R1 class. One has k e n  selected.  If both agents are 
indi f ferent  over two Ij classes ,  and, hence, indifferent  over a l l  three classes,  
then the  image is well defined. This completes the proof. 
The remining part of the part a is to show t h a t  the above construction 
captures the  s p i r i t  of a l l  possible choices of F. Namely, any F can be represented 
by a function of a s ingle  variable over the non- indifference sets. The proof of 
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this assertion is simple i f  I had required F to be nonconstant over 
&{Ij  (k, 1) , I j  (k,2)} for  a t  l e a s t  tuo choices of j. Because I did not, I need to 
show that  F can't be constant valued over 13 except when everyone but the jth agent 
is indifferent, and then the jt h agent is a dictator for  R j  . 
h m a  5. Let  Lj = .Clr: for 5 I k, t b m  is an x,' in Ij(s)  so t ha t  
P(xl ' , . .  ,&,.. ,%-) cbenges R j  classes as & varies be- Ij (k, l)  and U(k,2)}. 
Suppxse that  ( U j L j ) > l  and that u,v a m  in UjLj. ThE?1.e exists a cbice of j ,  say 
j=3, so that th ranking for one of *e -ts, say v, need not be in P (v,3) 
wben u infl- th R3 C&COIE. 
Proof. Suppose j E L j  , j= 1,2,  and that  the l e m  does not hold for  these 
values of j. Thus, whenever j influences the R j  outcome, the other agent, k, nust 
be in Ij (k,3).  Of c o m e ,  the Ij rankings of agents k 2 3 my be specified. 
According to the domain overlap conditions, the restrict ions fo r  agents 3 to N can 
be satisfied for  both j classes. Also, by the. indifference overlap conditions, 
agent 1 can vary between s e t s  I 2  (1,3) nil (1, u)  , u = 1,2,  w h i l e  agent 2 varies 
betweensets 11(2,3)nI2(2,v), v=1,2. T h i s  forces bothagents to be i n  
I3 (k, 1)UI3 (k,2). The sm armrent  used in  the proof of Theorem 2 proves tha t  the 
the R3 outcome changes even though a l l  voters remin in fixed I3 classes. This 
proves the l em.  
To prove the theorem, assm tha t  j E L j  , j = 1, 2. Fur themre ,  assm 
t ha t  there is a profile where agent 2 need not be in I1(2,3) when agent 1 can 
influence the R1 outcome. (According to Lem 5, such profiles can be found with a 
relabelling of indices.) Now, suppose there is a profile where agent 1 need not be 
i n  12 (1,3) when agent 2 influences the R2 outcorn. I t  follows from the domain 
overlap conditions with indifference tha t  whatever are the requirements on agents 3 
to n, they can be similtaneously satisfied.  Thus, the essence of the problem is 
the  same as in  the proof of Theorem 2, and t.he same contradiction is arrived a t .  
This mans that. agent 1 mt be indifferent (and there may be added constraints on 
the other agents) when agent 2 has an influence on the R2 outcome. T h i s  mans tha t  
1 E Lz. The rest of the proof, to find the ordering on the indices that  defines 
the  sequential dictators,  is the obvious induction and ordering argument using 
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Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose the res t r i c t ion  on the domin is imposed on 
agent 1. The defini t ion of F depends on which s e t s  are omitted from 1 ( 1 ) .  The 
following lenm identif ies each set i n  this intersection i n  a useful rmnner. 
b m m  6. h u m  tht lib thme IJ sets s a t i s f y  the res t r ic ted  damin oorrditicm ard 
t h  dcumin overlap c a n d i t h ,  ard for each cbice of j, IJ consists of t m  
disjoint c-. For e a c h s e t ,  2, in I ( l ) ,  t h m  is a permrtation (a,b,c) of 
(1,2,3) so t h a t  Z is a singleton in I a ( l ) n Ib ( l ) ,  lm t  A is mt a singleton in 
Ia(l)fUc(l) or in Ib(l)fUc(l).  Irdex c is called lh "pivotdl index" for Z. 
Example: For Z = B = Ccl>c3 >cz3, the pivotal index corresponds to the class 
P(1,Z). As a quick way to determine the pivotal index, notice from Figure 1 t h a t  
the two regions adjacent to this ranking ~ g i o n ,  B, a l l  lie i n  one of the  P(1,2)  
classes,  but t h i s  group IA,B, C3 does not lie i n  only one P ( i ,  j) class  f o r  any other 
choice of (i , j ) . 
The proof of the l e m  is rmch the sam as tha t  of Lem 4. Notice t ha t  
fo r  each choice of Z, there are two perrmtations, but b t h  give rise to the sam 
pivotal index. 
Assume tha t  the res t r i c t ions  are imposed on voter 1, and let  2 be one of 
the s e t s  t ha t  is not i n  C1. The f irst  assert ion is tha t ,  with a pxsible 
relabdling of t h  indices and with a passible CI- of clwice of Z B Cl, w e  can 
assume tkt j = 1 is t k  pi mtal index for Z and that Cl nIj (1, s) # @ for j = 2, 3, 
s= 1, 2. To see t h i s ,  assum t h a t  1 is the  privotal index f o r  Z. Now, by 
definit ion,  Z is not a singleton in  I l ( l ) n I 2 ( 1 )  nor i n  I l ( l ) n I 3 ( l ) .  If the  other 
t e r m  i n  each intersection is i n  C1, then, by use of the domin overlap conditions, 
it follows t h a t  the assert ion is sa t i s f i ed .  So, suppose e i t he r  one, o r  b t h  
intersect,ions have no term in C1. If b t h  intersections f a i l  to meet C, , then C, 
mts only one of the I1 ( 1) classes ,  s o  I1 (1 ) can be replaced with J1( 1) - the  
singleton equivalence class of everything. If one other class f a i l s  to have C1 
met b t h  s e t s ,  then it too can be replaced with the singleton equivalence class.  
Here the overlap conditions are t r i v i a l l y  s a t i s f i e d ,  s o  this cannot occur. Thus, 
C1 mts both I j ( l , s ) ,  j = 2 , 3 ,  s=1 ,2  classes, and t w o  of the  s e t s  i n  I j ( l ) n I 3 ( l )  
are not i n  C, . This mans t h a t  the  assert ion holds. 
The remining s i tua t ion  is t h a t  f o r  one choice, say 11 ( l)nI2 ( I ) ,  the  set 
accompanying Z is in C , ,  ht in I l ( l ) n I 3 ( 1 ) ,  the s e t  accompmying Z, Y, is not i n  
C1. The pivotal index f o r  Y is 2. We already know, from this construction, t h a t  
the  s e t  accompanying Y i n  12  ( l )n I1 (1 )  is not in C1. If the set accompanying Y i n  
I2 ( 1) 1313 ( 1) is not i n  C1 , then w e  are i n  the  same s i tua t ion  analyzed above f o r  Z , 
s o  the assert ion holds with Y and 2 i n  place of Z and 1. If this set is i n  C , ,  
then we have e lemnts  of C1 i n  both 11 (1) and both I 2  (1) classes. This completes 
the proof of the  assertion. 
Choose the  indices on the  I j ( 1 )  classes so  t h a t  before the res t r i c t ions  are 
imposed, I 2  (1, s) nI3 (1, s )  mets both 11  (1) classes.  Likewise, choose the  indices i n  
the  range so t h a t  R Z s  fR3, , S= 1 , 2 ,  mets both R 1  classes.  Choose the indices on 
I j  (1) so t h a t ,  before the res t r i c t ions ,  a = 11 (1,l)I'IIt (1 , l )nIa  (1 ,2)  j @ and El = 
I 1 2 1  ( 1 2 1  1 j . Define F so  t h a t  the  Rj irmge of F is Rj ,  i f f  x, is 
i n  I j ( l , s ) ,  j=2,3 ,  s = 1,2.  Note t h a t  A is e i t h e r  a o r  D. If b o t h a  and 13 are i n  
the  restricted s e t s ,  then define the R l  imge i n  any desired m e r  based on the 
ent r ies  i n  11. For instance, it can be determined by which 11 (2 ) class contains 
x2,  o r  by a m j o r i t y  vote of a l l  voters, etc. I f  one of these s e t s ,  say D,  is not 
i n  the res t r i c t ions ,  then let the  R1 hmge of F be the  unique R1 class t h a t  
contains R22fE31 when x, is in I1(1 ,2) .  When x, is i n  I1(1 ,1) ,  let the  R1 i w e  be 
determined i n  any desired mnner. 
To see t h a t  F is well defined over IlnI2nI3, note t h a t  i f  x, is not 
e i t h e r  a o r  8 ,  then it rmst be i n  1 2 ( l , s ) n I ~ ( l , s )  f o r  one choice of s. Thus, 
the  irnage of F is R2, fX3, , which mets both R1 classes.  If x, is a o r  8, 
then the  intersect ion of t h e  R2 and R3 iwes uniquely defines t h e  R1 irmge. 
This is the  def in i t ion  of F. Both values are not i n  the  domin of x, ,  s o  this 
completes the  proof. 
Next, s u p p s e  t h a t  11 (1) consists  of a s ingle equivalence set, and I2 (1) and 
I3(1) each have two sets. C1 has only two sets i n  12( l )nI3(1) ,  SO c b s e  the 
indicing s o  t h a t  1 2 ( l , s ) n I 3 ( l , s )  I $  f o r  s = 1,2. The R j  imge of F is R j ,  i f f  x, 
E I j ( l , s ) ,  j = 2,3,  s = 1,2,  and the R1 i w e  is determined i n  any desired n m e r .  
If the  res t r i c t jons  leave three sets i n  I2 (1)nI3 ( I ) ,  then F always can be 
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 presented as a funct ion of one variable.  This is because, as I have already 
shown, i f  F is not  represented by a function of one var iab le ,  then  voter  1 mrst 
have an influence on tk outxom of tw classes.  Clearly,  this mwt  be sets R2 and 
R3.  But, no mtter how the R j  inrages of F are defined i n  tern of which 
I j  ( 1)class , j = 2 , 3 ,  contains xl , there  needs is one case w h e r e  t h e  image is not 
R2sfR3,, s 1,2 .  This forces a s i t u a t i o n  w k r e  t he  R1 w e  is uniquely 
determined, and it is determined by xl . Because F: 11-- >R1 and because I1 (1) is a 
singleton,  it follows t h a t  tk R 1  image of F is fixed. T h i s  completes the  proof. 
Proof of Corollary 4.2. T h i s  is a straightforward argument using the  ideas 
m t i v a t i n g  t h e  statement. As i n  the  proof of Theorem 4 ,  we need to have tw R j  
s e t s  where t h e  t h i r d  Ra outxome is not determined. This forces  th def in i t i on  of 
F. Incidently, when becomes s m l l e r ,  but it still admits a non-dictatorial 
s i t u a t i o n ,  t he  combinatorics usual ly restrict t he  de f in i t i on  of F. 
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